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We analyze the price effect of the introduction of Collective Action Clauses (CACs) in all newly 
issued sovereign bonds of Eurozone countries as of January 1, 2013. By allowing a majority of 
creditors to modify payment obligations, such clauses reduce the likelihood of holdouts while 
facilitating strategic default by the sovereign. We find that CAC bonds trade in the secondary 
market at lower yields than otherwise similar no-CAC bonds. The yield differential widens in 
countries with worse ratings and in those with stronger legal systems. The results suggest that 
CACs are seen as pro- rather than anti-creditor provisions. 




“Collective action clauses . . . are really an international provision that is recommended the world 
over in case of any and all issuances in order to facilitate crisis management; not to take away, 
not to be in any shape hostile to a country, but to help it.” 
 
Christine Lagarde, responding to a question about proposed Euro area reforms at the 
European Parliament (December 2, 2019) 
 
A key question in both law and finance is how contract provisions as well as contract enforcement matter 
for the pricing of securities. This question has been tackled extensively in the context of corporate issuers, 
where it has been shown that contract terms are priced both domestically and internationally (e.g., Qian 
and Strahan (2007); and Bae and Goyal (2009)) and that the legal framework – both the issuer’s 
jurisdiction and that of the country where contracts are enforced – affects corporate borrowing costs as 
well as governance (e.g., Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2004); and Ball, Hail and Vasvari (2018)). In this 
context, debt covenants and legal doctrines emerge as substitutes. For example, bonds issued in the US 
by firms incorporated in countries with stronger creditor rights have fewer covenants (Qi, Roth and Wald 
(2011)) and the use of restrictive covenants in weak credit protection countries is associated with lower 
cost of debt (Miller and Reisel (2012)). In a similar spirit, country characteristics such as legal protections 
for minority investors are found to be complements to firm-level governance in less developed countries, 
while they are susbtitutes in countries with high enough levels of investor protections (Doidge, Karolyi 
and Stulz (2007)). 
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We bring the question of the pricing of debt covenants and the interrelationship with the legal 
framework to the sovereign domain. The design of sovereign debt contracts has been at the forefront of 
the academic and policy debate since the mid-1990s, when CAC provisions specifying the minimum 
vote to modify payments were introduced into foreign-law bonds issued by emerging market nations as 
a contractual solution to avoid prolonged and costly battles with holdout creditors following defaults (see 
Panizza, Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2009); Häseler (2009); Aguiar and Amador (2014)).1 
Within the context of emerging markets sovereign issuers, the relevance of CACs on the pricing of 
debt has been extensively discussed. On the one hand, CACs are viewed as pro-creditor provisions as 
they improve coordination among creditors through a reduction of the holdout problem, thus increasing 
investors’ recoveries in case of sovereign default and ultimately lowering bond yields (e.g., Kletzer 
(2004); and Haldane, Penalver, Saporta and Shin (2005)). On the other hand, CACs are regarded as anti-
creditor provisions since, by making restructuring easier, they encourage opportunistic behavior on the 
side of the borrower in terms of strategic default and thus lead to higher bond yields (e.g., Dooley (2000); 
and Shleifer (2003)). 
In trying to assess which of these opposing effects matters more for bond pricing, the empirical 
literature has not yet reached a consensus. Some studies fail to find pricing differences associated with 
CAC provisions (e.g., Becker, Richards and Thaicharoen (2003) and Richards and Gugiatti (2003)), 
while others document that their price impact depends on borrowers’ creditworthiness. Among these, 
CACs are associated with lower yields for good quality issuers and higher yields for bad quality issuers 
(Eichengreen and Mody (2004)), lower yields for bad quality borrowers only (Bradley and Gulati 
(2014)), or lower yields for middle quality issuers only (Bardozzetti and Dottori (2014)). Although the 
foregoing empirical studies employ different samples (issuers and time periods, primary or secondary 
market data), they all share a focus on emerging market nations issuing bonds under foreign law. This 
bears on the analysis in important ways. 
First, there is the matter of how to disentangle the covenant from the jurisdiction, i.e., the CAC 
provision from the governing law of the contract. Many authors use the latter as a proxy for the presence 
(or absence) of the former. The typical assumption, made particularly in early papers on the topic, was 
                                                 
1 The policy debate centered around an IMF proposal for a statutory sovereign debt restructuring mechanism. Failing to 
achieve consensus, the proposal for a sovereign bankruptcy scheme was shelved and the inclusion of CACs prevailed as the 
only viable solution to facilitate debt restructuring for emerging countries (Gelpern and Gulati (2009)). The need for a 
bankruptcy regime for sovereigns (similar to the one that applies to banks and non-financial firms) has recently gained 
renewed momentum (Bolton (2016)), along with proposals for a more explicit seniority structure (Chatterjee and Eyigungor 
(2015)). 
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that bonds issued by emerging countries under English law had CACs, while those under New York law 
did not (e.g., Becker, Richards and Thaicharoen (2003); Richards and Gugiatti (2003); and Eichengreen 
and Mody (2004)). Alternatively, Bardozzetti and Dottori (2014) are able to identify the CAC inclusion, 
but do not control for the laws under which the contracts were written. However, as shown in Bradley 
and Gulati (2014), jurisdictions differ in contractual terms other than the inclusion of CACs; and the 
qualified threshold of creditors required for amending payment terms in the CAC provision displays 
variation across contracts – even conditioning on the same law. This implies that the nexus between the 
covenant and the jurisdiction is nuanced: the law governing the bond cannot be taken as a straight proxy 
for the presence (or absence) of the provision, and the effect of the provision cannot be assessed 
abstracting from the governing law. 
Second, there is the question of how to empirically identify the price impact of CACs. When issuing 
bonds under foreign law, the vast majority of countries make use of either English or New York law, but 
rarely both. Thus, even assuming that the applicable foreign law is a valid proxy for CAC provisions, the 
identification of the pricing effect comes from cross-country variation. 
More recently, the empirical literature has focused on the role of the governing law in the pricing of 
developed countries’ bonds. The argument behind these studies is the so-called “local law advantage”: 
domestic-law bonds provide, relative to bonds issued under foreign law, weaker legal protection since 
the contract terms can, at least in principle, be altered retroactively by passing local legislation. In line 
with this, Chamon, Schumacher and Trebesch (2018) find that foreign-law bonds issued by eight 
Eurozone sovereigns with maturity between 2006-2013 trade at a premium, in distressed countries, 
compared to domestic-law bonds.2 However, as mentioned above, bonds under foreign laws differ in 
terms of contractual terms other than CACs (see Bradley and Gulati (2014)), while domestic-law bonds 
issued by Euro area countries did not contain CAC provisions until 2013 and were identical in other 
respects other than the variations among the local laws in question. Thus, it is difficult to assess whether 
the cumulative evidence on the foreign-law premium is the byproduct of the better legal protection 
embedded in the (foreign) jurisdiction of issuance or stems from the included contract provisions. 
                                                 
2 Other studies on the role of foreign versus domestic governing law include Choi, Gulati and Posner (2011), which focuses 
on a single pair of Greek bonds, one issued under English law and the other under domestic law, and Clare and Schmidlin 
(2014), which compares Eurozone countries (whose debt is issued predominantly under local law) with EU members that do 
not use the euro (whose debt is issued predominantly under foreign law). 
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Our goal in this paper is to study the pricing impact of CACs by making use of a unique event – the 
introduction of CACs in bonds of Eurozone countries as of January 1, 2013.3 This initiative mandated 
the introduction of the same clause, which allows modification of the payment obligations subject to the 
approval of the same qualified majorities of creditors, for all Eurozone countries, irrespective of the 
characteristics of the issuer and the law governing the issuance. Thus, the question we investigate is 
whether the mandatory replacement of unanimity of creditors’ consensus with a “supermajority voting” 
may lead to higher borrowing costs to the issuer thus outweighting the benefits of quicker restructuring, 
or rather the opposite. In this sense, the paper helps shed light on the debate on optimal voting schemes 
(e.g., Aghion and Bolton (1992); Holden (2005); and Maggi and Morelli (2006)) by providing empirical 
evidence on the convenience of majority rules as opposed to unanimity of consensus in the context of 
sovereign debt contracts. 
Despite the Euro CACs applying to bonds issued under both foreign and domestic law, we focus our 
analysis only on the latter. We do this for three reasons. First, we want to keep the domestic law fixed 
(e.g., German or Irish law) so as to isolate the impact of the mandated CAC provision. Second, Eurozone 
countries issue the overwhelming majority of bonds under domestic law, while reverting to foreign law 
bonds only sporadically.4 By focusing on domestic law, we are therefore able – in contrast with previous 
studies – to adopt a matching approach whereby we compare bonds with similar characteristics 
(including the law) except the new provision. In particular, given the large number of bonds issued by 
Eurozone countries under domestic law, we are able to match CAC bonds with no-CAC bonds issued by 
the same country, under the same law, denominated in the same currency and with almost similar residual 
maturities. Since other bond-level characteristics are likely to affect yields (e.g., interest rate risk and 
liquidity risk) we control for these within a standard parametric regression setup. This approach enables 
us to identify the price effect of CACs within countries rather than across countries. Finally, focusing on 
                                                 
3 Article 12(3) of the ESM Treaty stated: “Collective Action Clauses shall be included, as of January 1, 2013, in all new euro 
area government securities, with maturity above one year, in a way that ensures that their legal impact is identical.” 
4 As of this writing, for example, over 99 percent of the debt of the most heavily indebted Eurozone nation, Italy, is under 
local law (Arnold, Gulati and Panizza (2019)). For the Eurozone countries in our sample, many of whom issue between a half 
dozen and a dozen sovereign bonds a year, we observe only the following small number of foreign-law bond issuances 
between January 2013 and June 2014: Austria 0, Belgium 0, Finland 4, France 0, Germany 0, Ireland 0, Italy 0, Luxembourg 
0, the Netherlands 0, Portugal 0, Slovakia 6, Slovenia 5, Spain 1 (sources: Bloomberg, Dealogic and Thomson One). Five key 
countries, i.e., Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, did not issue any foreign-law bond in the five 
years before and five years after January 1, 2013; Ireland issued only 2 in 2017 (with a peculiar 46 and 47 years in maturity), 
while Finland issued 11 both before and after. The other countries issued a handful of foreign law bonds in seemingly random 
years. 
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domestic (as opposed to foreign) law bonds allows us to examine whether the impact of the CAC reform 
on yields is a function of the credibility of the legal system under which the contract provision is adopted. 
We begin our analysis with a simple model of sovereign lending that illustrates the main trade-off 
involved in the introduction of CACs between more orderly restructuring in distress and greater 
incentives for the government to behave strategically.5 The framework has two main features. First, the 
sovereign is plagued by the classic “willingness-to-pay-problem”, as in Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), due 
to weak contractual enforcement. Second, bondholders are assumed to be able to coordinate around a 
debt restructuring agreement only if CACs are embeded in the bond contract. 
We show that the yield differential between CAC and no-CAC bonds depends on the likelihood of 
the sovereign engaging in an Essential Restructuring (i.e., restructuring the CAC bonds, while defaulting 
on the no-CAC bonds) versus a Strategic Default (i.e., restructuring the CAC bonds, while honoring the 
no-CAC bonds). When the former effect dominates, CAC bonds trade at higher prices/lower yields 
relative to no-CAC bonds, while the opposite is true when the latter is more relevant. Moreover, our 
model predicts the yield differential between the two types of bonds to be a function of the country rating 
and other key country characteristics that affect the cost of defaulting for a government – such as the 
quality of the domestic legal system. In particular, the model predicts that the yield differential between 
CAC and no-CAC bonds widens (i.e., it becomes more negative) for less creditworthy borrowers and for 
better legal systems provided that the incentives for the government to behave strategically remain 
contained. 
To test these implications, we compare the secondary market yields of Eurozone bonds issued under 
domestic law after January 1, 2013 (i.e., bonds with CAC provisions) with those of bonds issued prior to 
that date (i.e., bonds without CAC provisions). 
We find a significant yield differential: our estimates indicate that yields on CAC bonds are, on 
average, lower by 8 to 18 basis points (bps) than those of matched no-CAC bonds, which translates into 
larger proceeds by €0.81 to €1.76 bln. Moreover, the yield differential is persistently negative and 
statistically significant throughout the sample period. 
We then turn to test the model’s predictions that relate the price impact of CACs to the sovereign’s 
creditworthiness and quality of the legal system by making use of cross-country heterogeneity in credit 
ratings and quality of law indicators. Consistent with the model, we document that the differential of the 
                                                 
5 The idea that by relaxing the payment obligations, the borrower may have incentives to default strategically is also present 
in other contexts such as mortgage delinquency (see, e.g., Mayer, Morrison, Piskorski and Gupta (2014); Scharlemann and 
Shore (2016); and Gerardi, Herkenhoff, Ohanian and Willen (2017)). 
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yield on CAC bonds relative to no-CAC bonds widens in countries with worse ratings and in those with 
stronger legal systems. 
Finally, we consider a falsification exercise where we assume that the Euro CAC initiative took place 
two years earlier than it actually did. To this end, we compare secondary market yields of pseudo-CAC 
bonds – i.e., Eurozone bonds issued under domestic law after January 1, 2011 – with those of same-
issuer, same-law, same-currency bonds issued prior to that date (i.e., pseudo no-CAC bonds) that have 
similar residual maturities. Repeating all our analyses on this sample of bonds, we find no evidence of 
yield differentials across these bonds. 
To sum up, we document that CAC provisions in the domestic-law debt issued by Euro area countries 
are viewed favorably by market participants so that bonds with CACs trade at higher prices (lower yields) 
than comparable bonds without CACs. We interpret this result as suggesting that the trade-off entailed 
by CAC provisions in terms of the benefits of more orderly creditor coordination versus the moral hazard 
costs from strategic default is resolved in favor of the former in our sample countries. Anticipating this, 
investors are ready to pay higher prices for CAC bonds. The price impact is more pronounced in countries 
with worse credit worthiness, and thus with a sizable probability of Essential Restructuring and, 
importantly, with a legal system of good quality. Overall, these findings are consistent with recent papers 
in the sovereign debt area suggesting that the likelihood of strategic default by sovereigns, and 
particularly those in the developed world with strong institutions, is low (see Yeyati and Panizza (2011); 
Collard, Habib and Rochet (2015); and Daniel (2019)). 
Our analysis makes use of a legal event that encompasses a series of desirable features that are rare to 
find: it involves the modification of a single contract clause, this change is exogenous to any individual 
issuer, and the contracts with the new clause can be compared with otherwise identical (or at least similar) 
contracts. As such, the Euro CAC initiative constitutes a unique laboratory to address the question of 
whether, and to which extent, markets price contract terms in the sovereign domain. Our paper is in fact 
the first to clearly isolate the impact of the contract provision from that of the jurisdiction of issuance 
and thus to show that the mandatory imposition of supermajority rules in sovereign debt contracts reduces 
the borrowing costs to the issuer. Our results contribute to the debate on optimal voting schemes (e.g., 
Aghion and Bolton (1992); Holden (2005); and Maggi and Morelli (2006)) and are informative for the 
ongoing debate concerning the enhancement of the supermajority rule in Euro area sovereign debt 
contracts through the introduction of the so-called “single limb” voting, which allows for the aggregation 
of the votes of creditors across different series of bonds as opposed to the current “dual limb” voting 
requiring a certain minimum vote to be satisfied in each series of bonds. 
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The paper is organized as follows. Section I provides the background on the Euro CAC initiative and 
sets forth our predictions with the use of a simple model. Section II describes the dataset construction. 
Section III presents the empirical findings on the average price impact of CAC provisions, while Section 
IV exploits country heterogeneity. Section V presents some further results in terms of falsification tests. 
Section VI concludes. 
I. Background on the 2013 Euro CAC Initiative and Hypotheses 
CACs are contractual provisions that allow for a supermajority of creditors in a single bond series, or 
across different series of bonds, to vote on modifications of the payment obligations to the debtor in a 
fashion that binds dissenting creditors. In the context of sovereign bonds, where there is no statutory 
bankruptcy mechanism, the provisions permit the sovereign and a majority of creditors to agree to a 
reduction in the amount that the sovereign owes, without facing the problem of holdouts (Eichengreen 
and Portes (1995)).6 CACs are therefore a mechanism to ameliorate the inefficiencies caused by intra-
creditor conflicts, allowing investors to recover more in the case of a sovereign default (e.g., Haldane, 
Penalver, Saporta and Shin (2005)). 
However, by facilitating restructuring, CACs may also exacerbate the so-called “willingness to pay” 
problem (e.g., Eaton and Gersovitz (1981)), whereby the sovereign cannot commit to repay creditors 
even in states of the world where it has the capacity to do so. That is, the sovereign may have an incentive 
to default strategically; an incentive that is exacerbated as it becomes easier to restructure the debt (e.g., 
Dooley (2000); and Shleifer (2003)). Given this trade-off, the effect of CACs on bond yields is 
ambiguous, as it ultimately depends on both the ability of the sovereign to pay and the constraints on 
strategic default (e.g., domestic institutions such as courts) under which it operates. 
While being present in almost all foreign-law sovereign bonds since early 2000s, CACs were largely 
absent in domestic-law bonds until the 2013 Euro CAC initiative. In this section, we describe the 
background of this initiative and develop a simple model to derive predictions for our empirical analysis. 
A. Euro CAC Initiative 
The sovereign debt crisis that hit the Eurozone in 2010-2013 developed in a number of stages culminating 
in the Greek sovereign debt restructuring. As a result, the Euro area policy makers put in place a number 
                                                 
6 CACs are particularly important in the sovereign debtor context because of the absence of any bankruptcy system, such as 
Chapter 11 in the United States, that could perform a similar function of ameliorating the holdout problem. 
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of measures including those aimed at ensuring that the resolution of future sovereign debt crises would 
not be so costly to the Euro system: CAC provisions were a key element of this policy response (Hofmann 
(2014)). 
The 2013 Euro CAC initiative mandated the inclusion of standardized and identical CACs in all new 
Eurozone sovereign bonds issued after January 1, 2013 with maturities greater than one year. The 
provisions describe the majorities required to modify the payment terms for a single series of bonds 
(66.67 percent) as well as a cross-series modification (75 percent across all the series).7 These CACs 
apply to all new issues, irrespective of the governing law. In other words, issuers cannot engage in 
jurisdiction shopping (i.e., issuing under different laws) in order to escape having to use the Euro CACs. 
In this sense, the Euro CAC initiative engineered what was likely the single biggest change to sovereign 
bond contract terms ever (Gelpern and Gulati (2013)).8 
The Euro CAC initiative was intended to ensure private sector involvement in future sovereign 
restructurings by improving creditor coordination and deterring holdouts (Gelpern and Gulati (2013)). 
However, it was unclear how the provisions would play out in terms of cost of borrowing given that 
CACs had the potential to exacerbate the incentives for sovereigns to default strategically. Certain 
specificities of the Euro area setting might also affect the impact of the Euro CACs. In particular, the 
sharing of the same currency among countries might induce certain holders of a sovereign’s bonds such 
as other Eurozone sovereigns or institutions to vote in favor of a restructuring proposal in order to avoid 
disruptive consequences that may affect the value of the currency itself. This should reduce the prospect 
of holdouts in restructurings of Euro area bonds even more relative to what might happen in the case of 
CACs in independent countries’ debt.9 
                                                 
7 See 2012 Linklaters, “EU publishes mandatory Collective Action Clause for use in eurozone sovereign bonds from 1 January 
2013”, May. 
8 In shaping the CACs, Euro area policy makers borrowed from a US Treasury department initiative in the early 2000s, which 
focused on emerging market countries issuing bonds to foreign investors under New York law. The Euro area version of the 
initiative, however, was more ambitious in three ways. The size was larger (it applied to a multi-trillion dollar market as 
compared to one that was a few hundred billion), the scope was wider (applied via the local laws of every Euro member nation 
as opposed to a single one, New York), and the CAC provisions in question were more powerful (applying in an aggregated 
fashion across a full set of a nation’s bonds, as opposed to on a bond-by-bond basis). 
9 As of this writing, in 2020, policy makers in the Euro area are considering enhancing the effectiveness of the existing CACs 
in Euro area sovereign bonds starting in 2022, so as to further reduce the likelihood of holdout problems in future debt 
restructurings. Some EU members are however resisting this reform, on the grounds that making it easier for sovereigns to 
restructure will raise their cost of borrowing at an inopportune moment (Zettelmeyer (2018)). 
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B. The Model 
We develop a simple two-period (t= 1, 2) framework where a sovereign issues one unit of bonds of either 
of two types at date 1: bonds without CACs (“no-CAC” bonds) or bonds with them (“CAC” bonds). The 
two bond types differ in terms of the bondholders’ ability to act collectively and negotiate a debt 
reduction with the sovereign, as we explain below. The sovereign uses the funds to invest in a productive 
investment returning a stochastic output y at date 2, which is distributed according to the probability 
distribution function f(y) over [ , ]. 
Bondholders are assumed, for simplicity, to be risk neutral and their expected return is normalized to 
zero.10 The sovereign debt market is perfectly competitive, implying that the sovereign can extract all 
the surplus at time 1. We denote by Di the promised repayment on debt issued at date 1, where i = N, C 
indicates, respectively, no-CAC and CAC bonds. Debt is repaid at date 2 when the output is realized. 
The promise to repay Di is credible if it is in the sovereign’s interest to honor its debt obligations ex 
post. As typical in the literature, we assume that the sovereign repays as a way to avoid the cost that 
comes with defaulting, which, as in Bolton and Jeanne (2009), is modelled as a proportional output loss 
representing the loss of reputation and thus of market access during protracted and coordinated legal 
actions by creditors. Default can be avoided if the sovereign manages to negotiate a debt reduction with 
the creditors, whose ability to act collectively depends on the type of bonds they hold.11  
C. The Equilibrium With No-CAC Bonds  
No-CAC bonds require unanimous consensus among bondholders for any payment modification and are 
thus vulnerable to holdouts. For simplicity, we then assume that no-CAC bondholders cannot reach an 
agreement acceptable to everyone so that no-CAC bonds cannot be renegotiated. It follows that no-CAC 
bondholders receive either the promised repayment DN or 0, while the sovereign obtains  in case 
of repayment and 1   in case of default with γ > 0 representing the default cost.  
                                                 
10 Results are qualitatively similar in the case of risk averse investors. 
11 In what follows, we assume that the sovereign can behave vis a vis its creditors as in the foreign law context. One may ask 
whether this assumption is justified here given that a sovereign has control of the local law and can, at least in principle, alter 
it for any bonds where there are too many holdouts. This is what is referred to as the “local law advantage” in the literature 
and was crucial to the Greek restructuring in 2012 and the Barbados restructuring in 2018 (Buchheit and Gulati (2018)). 
However, this local law advantage has significant limitations on it, as a function of litigation costs and circumstances when it 
can be justified as in the case of the Greek restructuring of 2012 (Grund (2017)). Thus, for purposes of the model, we disregard 
the possibility of using the local law advantage. Rather, given also that we are interested in the yield differential between CAC 
and no-CAC bonds issued under the same jurisdiction, we focus on the fact that the likelihood of the sovereign behaving 
strategically will depend only on the size of the parameter γ representing the constraints imposed by the domestic legal system. 
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The sovereign chooses the action that maximizes its return at date 2 net of the repayment to 
bondholders so that it repays the no-CAC debt when: 
1  y, (1)
It follows that the sovereign repays if  and defaults otherwise. Anticipating this, at date 1 no-




D. The Equilibrium With CAC Bonds  
CAC bonds require only a majority of creditors to vote on modifications of payment obligations and thus 
are less vulnerable to holdouts than no-CAC bonds. This implies that CAC bondholders can coordinate 
more easily around a debt restructuring agreement and that the likelihood of costly litigation by holdout 
creditors in case of default is lower. For simplicity, we then assume that CAC bondholders can be 
coordinated at no cost for the sovereign around a debt restructuring agreement and that default entails a 
lower cost with CAC bonds than with no-CAC bonds.12 It follows that the sovereign has three options 
with CAC debt: repay	  and obtain ; renegotiate for a payment  and obtain ;	default 
incurring a cost αγy and thus obtain (1 – αγ)y, with 1.  
As before, the sovereign chooses the action that maximizes its return at date 2. Thus, it prefers 
renegotiating over defaulting if: 
1 )y. (3)
Bondholders always prefer a positive repayment to a default and, as in Bolton and Jeanne (2009), are 
modelled as having all the bargaining power in the renegotiation phase. Hence, they set  at the 
level that makes the sovereign indifferent between renegotiating and defaulting, that is: 
αγy. (4)
Similarly, the sovereign prefers repaying the promised repayment over renegotiating the debt if:  
, (5)
which, using(4), yields: 
                                                 
12 The CAC mechanism enables the debtor and its creditors to be better able to negotiate a settlement in a crisis and, therefore, 
reduce the costs of disruption by holdouts. This particular feature of CACs is further enhanced by the inclusion of acceleration 
and reverse acceleration provisions that are part of the supplement to the model Euro CACs. See Supplementary Explanatory 
Note to the Model Collective Action Clause (2012), Subsection I (“strongly” recommending the use of acceleration and 
reverse acceleration provisions in all Euro area sovereign bonds with CACs), at 
https://europa.eu/efc/sites/efc/files/supplemental_explanatory_note_on_the_model_cac_-_26_march_2012.pdf. 




It follows that the sovereign repays bondholders if  and renegotiates otherwise. Anticipating 
this, at date 1 CAC bondholders will require a repayment  that satisfies their participation constraint, 
which, using (4), is given by: 
γy 	 	 	 1 
 
(7)
E. Comparison of equilibria 
Comparing (2) with (7) highlights the role of CAC provisions for bondholders’ promised repayments. 
As illustrated in Figure 1, CACs introduce a trade-off in terms of creditor protection in the case when 
.13 In the region with a level of output 

 , which we define as Essential Restructuring, CAC 
bonds are better than no-CAC bonds in that the ability to coordinate allows CAC bondholders to obtain 
a positive payment  instead of 0. By contrast, CACs hurt bondholders in the region ∈ , ), which 
we define as Strategic Default, where the sovereign strategically exploits the possibility of restructuring 
the CAC debt. It follows that the difference between the promised repayments 	and  will depend 
on the likelihood of the Essential Restructuring versus the Strategic Default region. We have the 
following result. 
 
Proposition 1: The promised repayment on CAC bonds is lower than that on no-CAC bonds, i.e., 
, if and only if: 
γy 	 γy . (8)
Proof: See the Appendix.  
                                                 
13 It is easy to see that for  there is no trade-off so that CAC bonds always entail a lower promised repayment than 
no-CAC bonds. 
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The proposition suggests that CAC bonds will carry lower yields than no-CAC bonds when the higher 
expected repayment that CAC bondholders obtain in the Essential Restructuring region compensates 
them for the lower expected repayment they obtain in the Strategic Default region where no-CAC 
bondholders are fully repaid. When this happens, CACs are effective in protecting investors against 
holdouts, while at the same time containing the risk of strategic defaults. 
The relative importance of the Essential Restructuring and Strategic Default regions depends, in turn, 
on the probability distribution 	and the size of the default cost as represented by the parameter . 
We have the following comparative statics result. 
Proposition 2: Assume .	Then: 
i) For a given γ, the difference 	increases as the mass of the probability distribution f(y) in 
the Essential Restructuring region (i.e., for ∈ , ]) increases relative to the mass in the 
Strategic Default region (i.e., for ∈ [ , ]); 
ii) For a given f(y), the difference 	increases in the parameter 	if: 
y 	 . 
 
(9) 
Proof: See the Appendix.  
Part (i) of the proposition states that the difference in the promised repayments between no-CAC and 
CAC bonds increases as the region of Essential Restructuring, where CAC bonds are restructured while 
no-CAC bonds are defaulted upon, becomes more likely (in terms of output distribution) relative to that 
of Strategic Default, where CAC bonds are restructured but no-CAC bonds are repaid in full. 
Part (ii) of the proposition establishes the condition under which the difference  increases 
with the parameter . The term on the LHS of (9) represents the marginal increase, as  increases, in the 
expected payoff CAC bondholders obtain in the regions of Essential Restructuring and Strategic Default. 
The term on the RHS of (9) represents instead the increased probability of the Strategic Default region 
as  increases, where no-CAC bondholders are repaid in full. Thus condition (9) states that the difference 
	increases with  when the benefits to CAC bondholders in terms of higher repayments in the 
Essential Restructuring and Strategic Default regions dominate the higher likelihood of occurence of the 
Strategic Default region. 
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F. Empirical Predictions 
Propositions 1 and 2 enable us to generate some empirical predictions concerning the introduction of 
CACs. In particular, we expect CACs to reduce the cost of debt in countries where the sovereign has 
enough incentives to avoid behaving strategically. It is in these countries that the CAC provision is most 
useful in protecting bondholders in the case of Essential Restructuring, i.e., when the output is so low 
that without CACs the sovereign defaults and bondholders obtain nothing. 
We can then characterize the countries where we expect this to occur and in particular, in line with 
the empirical exercise we conduct, where the effect of CACs on bond yields is more pronounced in terms 
of the distribution f(y) of the sovereign’s output and the size of default cost as captured by the parameter 
. We measure the former with the credit rating of a country and the latter with proxies of a country’s 
quality of law. Worse country ratings correspond to more right-skewed output distributions than better 
ratings, and thus to a higher likelihood of the Essential Restructuring region. Similarly, a better quality 
of law entails a larger output loss in case of sovereign default, thus corresponding to a larger . As in the 
literature on the role that strong local institutions can play in protecting against expropriation attempts 
by local governments (North and Weingast (1989); Stasavage (2002); Acemoglu and Johnson (2005); 
and Breen and McMenamin (2013)), the idea is that countries with better laws and courts will provide 
better protection to investors against expropriation by the sovereign. 
In line with these arguments, we have the following predictions provided that the probability 
distribution f(y) is right-skewed enough and the quality of legal institutions of the country is good enough 
that the sovereign has a low likelihood of defaulting strategically: 
 
Prediction 1: The yield differential between CAC and no-CAC bonds widens (i.e., becomes more 
negative) as the sovereign’s creditworthiness deteriorates as measured by a worse country rating. 
 
Prediction 2: The yield differential between CAC and no-CAC bonds widens (i.e., becomes more 
negative) as the quality of law of a country improves. 
II. Dataset Description 
In our analyses we make use of two samples of bonds: bonds with CAC provisions issued after January 
1, 2013 (“CAC bonds”), and bonds without CAC provisions issued before January 1, 2013 that have 
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similar characteristics to CAC bonds (“Matched no-CAC bonds”). Our primary source of information is 
Bloomberg. 
CAC bonds are selected according to the following criteria: issued by national governments belonging 
to the Eurozone as of January 2013 (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain); 
denominated in Euro; with issuance between January 1, 2013 and June 30, 2014; with maturity (at 
issuance) between 1 and 30 years; with strictly positive amount issued; being either zero coupon or 
having a fixed coupon; noncallable, nonputtable, nonsinking fund, nonconvertible and not inflation 
linked. At this stage we select 106 bonds issued by 15 Eurozone countries.14 We further require bonds to 
be flagged by Bloomberg as including CACs, thus dropping four bonds (three issued by Belgium and 
one from Malta) for which this data field is missing.15 We finally resort to the Bloomberg, Dealogic and 
Thomson One databases to identify the governing law of these bonds, and supplement information from 
these sources with hand-collected data drawn from the offering circulars and prospectuses. We are able 
to find the governing law of 93 bonds issued by 14 Eurozone countries,16 out of which we identify 89 as 
domestic-law bonds. 
To build the sample of matched no-CAC bonds we first identify in Bloomberg the pool of bonds using 
criteria similar to the ones described above, with the sole exception that we now consider bonds issued 
before January 1, 2013 that mature after that date. We then retrieve the governing law of these bonds 
using the three data sources mentioned above, and select local-law bonds only. Again we check that these 
bonds are not flagged by Bloomberg as having CAC provisions.17 We perform a matching (without 
replacement) for each CAC bond with one bond in this pool conditioning on same issuer and same 
currency, and select the bond with the closest maturity date to that of the CAC bond we consider. For 
example, we match the 5YR Euro-denominated 1 percent French CAC bond issued on January 28, 2014 
(with an International Securities Identification Number equal to FR0011708080, maturity May 25, 2019) 
with the 15YR Euro-denominated 4.25 percent French no-CAC bond issued on June 10, 2003 (ISIN 
                                                 
14 There are no bond issuances that meet our criteria for Estonia, while Greece issued only short term bonds, i.e., with 
maturities less than a year, during our sample period. 
15 The rationale for this filter is to exclude bonds issued after January 1, 2013, but that were operating under a pre-existing 
MTN and were therefore exempt from the Euro CAC mandate. 
16 We drop bonds issued by Malta because we cannot retrieve their governing law. 
17 In principle, prior to the Euro CAC initiative, sovereigns could have voluntarily included CAC provisions in domestic-law 
bonds. However, this was almost never the case. From a combination of Bloomberg and our hand coding, we were able to 
identify only two local-law bonds issued prior to January 1, 2013 with CACs. Both were for a single sovereign, Slovenia. 
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FR0000189151, maturity April 25, 2019). Our procedure enables us to form 83 pairs of CAC and 
matched no-CAC bonds issued by 13 countries.18 
Table 1 provides the country breakdown at each stage of our data construction procedure. The country 
split for CAC issuances is in line with that observed for Euro-denominated long-term bonds in previous 
periods,19 where Belgium, France, Italy and Spain account for more than 50 percent of issuances. In 
economic terms, the largest issuers are France, Germany, Italy and Spain, which represent about 80 
percent of the total outstanding amount of CAC bonds by the end of 2014. The country breakdown we 
uncover using CAC bonds’ outstanding amount (see the last column in Table 1) is in line with what one 
obtains using central government long-term debt securities during the last quarter of 2014. 
Figure 2 displays the issuance activity (amount at issuance as well as the number of issuances) of 
CAC bonds between January 2013 and June 2014. Within six months from the inception of the Euro 
CAC initiative, all countries but Luxembourg had issued at least one bond with CACs. Figure 3 plots the 
time-series of the outstanding amount (sum of amount at issuance and reopenings) of CAC bonds,20 both 
in absolute terms and relative to the overall amount of long-term government debt. Figure 3 reveals that 
by the end of June 2014 about 13 percent of long-term bonds included the Euro CAC provision.21 The 
joint message of Figures 2 and 3 is that CAC bonds have gained importance, over time, in the context of 
Eurozone sovereign debt markets. 
For these CAC bonds we collect from Bloomberg daily mid-yields, prices (mid, ask and bid), amount 
outstanding and volume,22 between January 1, 2013 (or the issue date, for bonds issued later than January 
1, 2013) and December 30, 2014 (or the maturity date, for bonds maturing before December 30, 2014). 
For the sample of matched no-CAC bonds we collect the same variables between January 1, 2013 and 
December 30, 2014 (or the maturity date). We compute Macaulay duration, convexity, and percentage 
                                                 
18 The matching procedure drops all CAC bonds issued by Cyprus since before 2013 Cyprus issued bonds under English law 
only. We further discard the 15YR 2.25 percent bond issued by Luxemburg on March 13, 2013 (ISIN LU0905090048) because 
the only bond we could match it with has a very different maturity (ISIN XS0506445963, maturity date May 18, 2020). 
19 We have identified new issuances of Euro-denominated bonds with zero or fixed coupon and maturity at issuance between 
1 and 30 years between January 1, 2009 and June 30, 2010, and get country breakdowns that are similar to those documented 
in Table 1 for our CAC bonds. 
20 After issuing a new bond, governments can raise additional debt by reopening already existing securities. Reopenings are 
quite common: during our sample period, 70 (out of 83) CAC bonds have been reopened and, at the end of June 2014, they 
represent about 60 percent of the aggregate outstanding amount of CAC bonds. 
21 For each country, we define long-term government debt as the sum of general government long-term residual maturities 
(over 1 year) and short-term residual maturities (up to 1 year), in all currencies (source: ECB Statistical Data Warehouse). 
22 Bloomberg contains volume data separately for each exchange where a bond is listed. On average, bonds in our sample are 
listed on four exchanges, with considerable variation across countries – mean values range from 1.33 exchanges for Slovenian 
bonds to 9.1 exchanges for German bonds. Turnover is defined as total traded volume (i.e., aggregated across all exchanges) 
scaled by amount outstanding and winsorized, at the bond level, at the upper 95th percentile since for some bond-weeks 
turnover figures seemed implausibly high (i.e., well above 80 percent). 
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bid-ask spreads from daily prices. We create the variable , , 	 , ,
0.5 , , , which corrects the Macaulay duration by bond convexity. 23  To reduce the 
measurement error that may contaminate daily data, we carry out our analyses at the weekly level and 
derive weekly variables as simple averages of daily values, dropping weeks with negative or zero yields. 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics of bond-level variables for the CAC and the matched no-CAC 
samples. Here, we consider only those weeks where both the CAC bond and the matched no-CAC bond 
have available bond-level information. To illustrate, we include the 15YR Euro-denominated 4.25 
percent French no-CAC bond issued on June 10, 2003 from the fifth week of 2014 onwards, since the 
CAC bond with similar residual maturity is issued at the end of January 2014. This ensures that our panel 
dataset has the same number of weekly observations for CAC and matched no-CAC bonds. 
The yield differential between CAC and no-CAC bonds is economically small (-2 basis points) and 
statistically insignificant. On average, CAC bonds carry more interest rate risk (higher duration), while 
proxies for liquidity risk give a more nuanced picture: CAC provisions are associated with smaller 
amounts outstanding and lower turnover, and also with narrower bid-ask spreads. These differences in 
bond-level characteristics between the two groups warrant the risk-adjustments of the bond yields in 
order to ascertain the effect of CAC provisions – an issue we deal with in Section III. 
Finally, as a by-product of our matching procedure, maturities between the two groups of bonds are 
no longer different. Figure 4 plots the histogram of the absolute distance (in months) between maturities 
in the two samples. For 50 bond pairs (representing about 60 percent of our sample) the difference in 
maturities is less than 6 months, and for 69 pairs (representing more than 80 percent of our sample) it is 
less than one year. 
III. CAC Provisions and Yield Differentials 
We start by investigating the impact of CAC provisions on bond yields. To this end, we compare the 
yields of CAC bonds with those of matched no-CAC bonds. Our empirical strategy is to estimate the 
following random-effects model: 
 
, , , , , , , (10)
                                                 
23 In principle, we could include convexity as an additional measure of bond risk. However, in our sample, Macaulay duration 
and convexity are highly collinear (the linear correlation equals 0.934). We therefore opt for an alternative measure of bond 
price risk – which we label simply as “duration”. Our results are unchanged when using Macaulay duration alone. 




where  is a bond-level random component, , ,  is the log of the mid-yield (in percent) for 
bond i (issued by country c) during week t,24  is our main variable of interest (an indicator equal to 
one for a CAC bond and zero for a matched no-CAC bond), and , ,  is a vector of control variables. 
The vector , ,  includes time (i.e., week) fixed effects that capture co-movement in Eurozone yields, 
and bond- as well as country-specific variables (definitions of the explanatory variables are collected in 
Appendix Table A1). We glean these covariates from previous empirical studies on CAC provisions that 
explore the determinants of yields at launch or in the secondary market (Becker, Richards and 
Thaicharoen (2003); Richards and Gugiatti (2003); Eichengreen and Mody (2004); Bardozzetti and 
Dottori (2014); Bradley and Gulati (2014)). 
Although we have matched CAC to no-CAC bonds along a number of dimensions (i.e., issuer, 
currency, fixed rate, governing law, and residual maturity), other bond-level characteristics affect risk 
and, in turn, yields. As a proxy for bond interest rate risk we include duration ( , , ), which is 
affected, among others, by the coupon structure. Moreover, since by construction matched no-CAC 
bonds are off-the-run while CAC bonds are on-the-run,25 we control for liquidity risk by means of bond 
	 , , , i.e., the log of the outstanding amount (in Euro mln), the bid-ask spread (in percent), 
	 , , , and , ,  (exchange-traded volume scaled by amount outstanding). 
Note that bond size is usually time-varying, at the bond level, due to reopenings. We map country 
Standard & Poor’s long-term issuer credit ratings (observed on Fridays) to a numeric scale and proxy 
country creditworthiness by means of , . Higher values indicate worse credit ratings: during our 
sample period, this variable ranges from 1 (AAA rating) to 12 (BB rating). 
The research question that is our focus motivates our choice to use unit-specific (i.e., bond) random 
effects, as opposed to fixed effects: our variable of interest – the inclusion of CAC provisions – is 
multicollinear with bond fixed effects. Bae and Goyal (2009) for example offer similar considerations 
when examining the relation between legal protection and bank loan characteristics in 48 countries: since 
their variables of interest – creditor and property rights indexes – show little within-unit (i.e., country) 
variation, they opt for random effects instead of fixed effects which “soak up some of the explanatory 
power of these slowly changing variables” (op. cit., p. 839). Random effects therefore emerge as a 
                                                 
24 We take the logarithm of the bond yields to mitigate the effect of potential outliers. However, results in our main analysis 
are unaffected if we use yields (in level). 
25 The positive yield differential between off- and on-the-run treasuries is well documented for the US market (e.g., Warga 
(1992) and Pasquariello and Vega (2009)), while we are unaware of similar studies for European sovereigns. 
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(partial) remedy to omitted variables, at least those that are uncorrelated with our covariates. We return 
to the issue of bond-level omitted variables in Section V. 
Table 3 reports random-effects (RE) estimation results for several specifications. Standard errors are 
adjusted for clustering at the level of the matched bonds in the sample. Column 1 in Table 3 refers to the 
baseline specification (10), and highlights the fact that yields increase with bond-level interest rate risk 
as well as with issuer credit risk, while liquidity risk measures are overall insignificant. This lack of 
significance is not surprising in light of the mixed evidence on the role of liquidity for Euro area 
government bonds: Favero, Pagano and von Thadden (2010) for example find that liquidity differentials 
are priced only for a subset of EMU countries, while Beber, Brandt and Kavajecz (2009) show that 
liquidity matters only in times of economic distress. 
Turning to our main variable of interest, CAC provisions significantly and negatively affect bond 
yields.26 Our estimates indicate that yields on CAC bonds are, on average, around 8 percent lower than 
those of no-CAC bonds ( 1 exp	 0.084 . Since the average yield on (matched) no-CAC bonds is 
equal to 1.7 percent, this corresponds to a reduction in yields by 13 bps or equivalently to an increase in 
proceeds by €1.34 bln (given that the outstanding amount of CAC bonds by the end of 2014 was equal 
to €993.49 blns, and assuming that yield reductions in the secondary markets transfer one-to-one to 
proceeds in the primary market and that the bonds are issued at par in the primary market). 
As explained in Section II, our empirical strategy to assess the effect of CAC provisions relies on the 
identification of a control group. While our matching procedure is carried out on a number of 
characteristics (issuer, currency, fixed rate, governing law, and residual maturity), as we noted before 
CAC and no-CAC bonds differ along other dimensions – as Table 2 shows. This begs the question, as to 
how the (possibly imperfect) quality of the matching procedure affects the finding that CAC provisions 
reduce yields. 
To this end, we first estimate specification (10) – excluding the CAC indicator – between January 1, 
2011 and December 31, 2012 for the entire pool of no-CAC bonds which we have previously used to 
identify our control group (24,590 bond-week observations for 294 unique bonds). Carrying out the 
estimation outside of our main time window delivers coefficients for the bond-level variables (Duration, 
Log Amount, Bid-Ask Spread, and Turnover) as well as issuer-level creditworthiness (Rating) that are 
not contaminated by our matching. We use the estimated coefficients “out-of-sample” to compute, for 
                                                 
26 We indicate the corresponding significance levels with a series of stars and, to facilitate the reading of the significance 
levels for the estimated CAC coefficients, which will be especially convenient in Tables 5, 6, 8 and 9, we also employ 
corresponding shades of grey. 
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our CAC and matched no-CAC bonds, residual (log-)yields as differences between realized and predicted 
(log-)yields during 2013-2014. Finally, we run a bond-level random-effects regression of these residual 
(log-)yields on the week fixed effects and the CAC indicator. The point estimate for CAC provisions 
equals -0.060 with a p-value of 0.001 – which translates into a 10 bps yield reduction or equivalently 
€0.97 bln in higher proceeds. Thus, we continue to document a statistically significant reduction in yields 
– although with a somewhat smaller economic magnitude – associated to the inclusion of CACs which 
reassures us of the matching procedure quality. 
We then turn to functional form misspecification concerns which may bias our coefficients, and 
perform two additional exercises. First, to control for non-linearities arising from bond-level 
characteristics, we employ bond-level random-effects estimation after augmenting specification (10) 
with squared and cross-products of all four independent bond-level covariates, involving ten (i.e, four 
squared plus six cross-products) additional variables in total. Second, to control for the non-linear effects 
of all covariates, we obtain the predicted values of bond (log-)yields from specification (10), and then 
carry out a bond-level random-effects estimation after adding to the baseline these predicted values raised 
to the power of two, three, ..., up to eight to the baseline – seven additional variables in total. Columns 2 
and 3 in Table 3 report regression results for these two exercises – to save space, we show only the 
coefficients for those variables included in the baseline specification. The CAC indicator is negative and 
significant in both columns, although with a somewhat smaller economic magnitude: CAC provisions 
associate with a yield reduction of 8 to 11 bps (or 5 to 7 percent), or equivalently with €0.81 to 1.11 bln 
in higher proceeds. 
The baseline specification is pooled across all issuers, so that all the coefficients for the control 
variables are estimated across countries. Thus, the reader may wonder whether cross-country 
heterogeneity in the response of yields to covariates bears on our findings. Such heterogeneity may 
manifest both through bond-specific characteristics as well as variables that are common to all Eurozone 
countries – captured by the week fixed effects. For instance, the empirical findings on the ECB 
(unconventional) monetary policy are suggestive that yields on sovereign bonds issued by different 
countries react differently to these interventions, while the response of the yield curve to ECB 
(conventional) monetary policy is quite homogeneous across countries.27 
                                                 
27 The implementation of the ECB’s Securities Markets Programme (SMP) has successfully driven down yields of the 
countries under the programme, with reductions ranging from -1 to -2bps (Italy) up to -17 to -21bps (Greece) per €1 bln of 
bond purchases (Eser and Schwaab (2016); and Ghysels, Idier, Manganelli and Vergote (2017)). Altavilla, Giannone and 
Lenza (2016) document that the ECB Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) announcements lowered bond yields in Italy 
and Spain while leaving yields on French and German bonds largely unaffected. The same authors find that a tightening in 
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To address these issues, we saturate the baseline specification with the interactions between country 
fixed effects and bond-level variables (52=13×4 interactions) as well as the interactions between country 
and time fixed effects (1,339=13×103 interactions).28 This demanding model, in essence, maintains only 
one panel restriction, i.e., the CAC indicator. Column 4 in Table 3 reports regression results for the 
saturated model. Yields continue to be negatively associated with CAC provisions, although both the 
economic magnitude and the statistical significance of this effect are lower than those documented for 
the baseline specification: the yield wedge between CAC and matched no-CAC bonds reduces to about 
5 percent (significant at the 6 percent level), or equivalently to a 9 bps reduction and a €0.86 bln increase 
in proceeds. 
As an alternative to the random-effects estimation, we use pooled OLS after replacing the bond 
random components  in specification (10) with bond-pair fixed effects. Also in this case we can arrive 
at an estimate for the coefficient of interest, , which is robust to omitted variables – although at a higher 
level of aggregation – correlated with our covariates. Table 3 reports regression results for the baseline 
equation (column 5), the two specifications that control for non-linear effects (columns 6 and 7), and the 
saturated model that includes the interactions between country fixed effects and the covariates (column 
8). The CAC indicator is always negative and highly significant throughout, with larger magnitudes than 
those provided by bond-level random-effects estimations: in economic terms, yields on CAC bonds are 
lower by 10 to 18 bps (6 to 11 percent), and proceeds are larger by €1 to €1.76 bln. 
The data-pooling used in panel estimation may mask a time-varying response of bond yields to CAC 
provisions. To address this matter, we perform OLS cross-sectional regressions for each week. The 
equation estimated at each time t is the same as in specification (10), dropping the bond random 
components  and the time fixed effects. We start our analysis from the last week of February 2013 
because we have at least 30 observations (15 CAC and 15 matched no-CAC bonds) from then onwards. 
The adjusted R-squared ranges between 0.63 and 0.95, with an average value of 0.81. The point estimates 
for the coefficient on the CAC indicator are plotted in Figure 5 (solid blue line) together with their 99 
percent confidence intervals (shaded grey area). As the figure reveals, we can exclude the possibility that 
yields between CAC and no-CAC bonds are identical for a substantial number of cross-sections (70 out 
                                                 
the stance of euro-area-wide (conventional) monetary policy exerts fairly homogeneous effects on yield curves across 
countries. 
28 We do not include country fixed effects as well as their interactions with country ratings as these are collinear with the 
(country × week) interactions. 
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of 96 weeks). Overall, the yield differential between CAC and matched no-CAC bonds is persistently 
negative and highly statistically significant throughout the sample period. 
IV. Country Heterogeneity 
We now shed light on how the yield differential varies across issuers. Table 4 reports average bond-level 
characteristics across CAC and matched no-CAC bonds, by country; for comparison, we reproduce, in 
the bottom row, the averages for the entire sample (from Table 2). We also present average residual log-
yields, given by the difference between realized values and those fitted by estimating specification (10) 
for the entire sample. 
Log-yields for CAC bonds are not statistically different from those of matched no-CAC bonds in five 
countries (Austria, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain). In three countries (Portugal, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia) CAC bonds trade at lower log-yields than no-CAC bonds, while in the remaining five countries 
(Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland and Luxembourg) the reverse holds. So at a first sight, the latter 
group of issuers seems to contradict our previous finding of a negative yield differential associated to 
CAC provisions. However, Table 4 shows also that for all these issuers, CAC bonds have larger 
durations. In addition, with the sole exception of Luxembourg, they also have smaller sizes, and, with 
the sole exception of Germany, they have wider (or not significantly different) bid-ask spreads. 
Since interest rate and liquidity risk are impounded in bond prices, assessing the price impact of CACs 
requires risk-adjusting yields. Indeed, looking at the average residual log-yields reveals that there is no 
country where CAC bonds trade at significantly higher yields than no-CAC bonds (comparing columns 
6 and 12 in Table 4). The log-yield differential is statistically significant at the 10 percent level (resp., 1 
percent level) for ten (resp., eight) issuers that represent about 70 percent (resp., about 63 percent) of the 
entire sample. And that results in no-CAC bonds overall having higher yields. In light of the model, this 
evidence suggests that there is a low likelihood of strategic default in our countries of interest and that 
CACs help providing better protection to bondholders in the case of Essential Restructuring. 
Among those issuers with significant yield reductions, the economic magnitude ranges between 5 bps 
for Germany (average yield on no-CAC bonds equals 1.049 percent) and 58 bps for Portugal (average 
yield on no-CAC bonds equals 2.430 percent). The associated increase in proceeds ranges between €2.6 
mln for Luxembourg and €446.4 mln for Italy. We now turn to disentangling the effect of CAC provisions 
according to the two variables that the theoretical model highlights as important drivers of the CAC and 
no-CAC yields (see the empirical predictions in Section I.F): issuer’s creditworthiness and quality of the 
legal system. 
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A. CAC Provisions and Creditworthiness 
First, we investigate how the CAC vs. no-CAC yield differential changes across the credit ratings 
spectrum.29 To this end we add to specification (10) the interaction between the CAC indicator and 
, , and estimate: 
 
, , , , , , , , (11)
 
It is worth mentioning that the coefficients on the constitutive terms  and ,  in the 
multiplicative model (11) cannot be interpreted as unconditional or average effects. We therefore follow 
Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006) in making inference from our interaction model.30 Our interest is in 
what we label as the “net impact of CAC provisions”, which, according to specification (11) is equal 
to	 , . The coefficient  would therefore be informative of the marginal effect of CACs for 
the unique case when in which , 0 – a case we never observe since we code the best rating, 
AAA, as , 1 and ,  increases with worsening credit quality.31 What is more, it is 
possible for the marginal effect of CACs to be significant for a meaningful range of country ratings even 
if the coefficient  is insignificant (see Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006), p. 74). 
Regression results for specification (11) are in row 1 in Table 5 and include the net effects of CACs 
(i.e., across the country ratings spectrum we observe in our sample, and the corresponding significance 
levels which are the outcome of a Wald test of the hypothesis , , assessed using a Student 
t distribution), their standard errors (one line below in brackets), and the percent of bond-week 
observations for each rating (two lines below in square brackets). 
As row 1 in Table 5 reveals, the net effect of CAC provisions is always negative, and its magnitude 
as well as statistical significance increases as issuer creditworthiness deteriorates: the marginal effect of 
CACs is significant at the 1 percent level for countries with AA rating or worse (about 75 percent of 
bond-week observations), where it ranges from a 6.4 percent (rating AA) to a 11.8 percent (rating BB) 
                                                 
29 The existing empirical literature (e.g., Bardozzetti and Dottori (2014); and Bradley and Gulati (2014), and references cited 
therein), has dealt with the effect of CAC provisions in foreign-law bonds issued by countries with different creditworthiness, 
however, reaching mixed results. 
30 Finance applications include Georgarakos and Pasini (2011) for the effect of trust and sociability on stock ownership and 
Carrieri, Chaieb and Errunza (2013) for the effect of openness and implicit barriers on globalization. 
31 Similarly, the coefficient on country ratings would be revealing of the impact of issuer creditworthiness on (log-)yields of 
matched no-CAC bonds only. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2817041
23 
 
yield reduction (recall that the table itself reports the estimated coefficients which represent log-yield 
reductions). 
We now investigate non-linearities with respect to issuer rating in the effect of CAC provisions on 
bond valuation. To this end, we create a binary variable Weak (Rating) which equals one when a country 
rating is equal or below the (approximately) lower quartile value cut-off (i.e., BBB-), and equal to zero 
otherwise.32 We then replace the interaction term ,  in specification (11) with 
	 , . The coefficient on the interaction term, , is therefore meaningful to assess 
significant differences in the net effect of CACs, which are given by  for the strong rating issuers and 
by the sum ∗ 1  =   for the weak rating issuers. 
As column 1 in Table 6 reveals, our procedure yields both a one percent-level significant negative 
interaction effect (null hypothesis, 0), and net effects for strong ( =0) and weak countries (
0 . The estimated effects are also economically relevant indicating that in strong countries CACs cut log-
yields by 80 bps, in weak countries by 35 bps more. 
These findings overall support the model`s prediction that the yield differential between CAC and no-
CAC bonds is wider (i.e., more negative) for issuers with worse credit quality, and that there are 
significant differences between high and low credit risk countries. 
B. CAC Provisions and Quality of Law 
We now analyze how the yield differential associated with CAC provisions depends on the strength of 
the legal system. We first screen the empirical literature on legal protection and financial outcomes (most 
notably Bae and Goyal (2009); Qi, Roth and Wald (2011); Miller and Reisel (2012); and Karolyi (2015), 
and the references therein) to identify the proxies for a country’s quality of law. We select six indicators: 
the formalism index (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2003); abbreviated as DLLS), 
the judicial efficiency index (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998); LLSV(EJ)), the 
property rights index (Heritage Foundation; Heritage), the law and order index (PRS Group/ICRG 
Political Risk Rating; PRS), and two rule of law indexes (LLSV(RL) and World Bank Worldwide 
Governance Indicator, abbreviated as World Bank). These indicators are broadly related to the quality of 
law, both in terms of the law on-the-books and law enforcement.33 In light of the model of Section I.B, 
                                                 
32 We also check adjacent cut-off values and find similar results. Given the focus on country variation in rating, we cluster 
standard errors at the country level but findings are similar when clustering at bond-pair level. 
33 Some of these indicators – DLLS, LLSV(EJ) and LLSV(RL) – are, by construction, purely cross-sectional since they are 
observed only once, while the others are, at least in principle, time-varying. During our sample period, however, only the 
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we view these as proxies for the model parameter – larger values for  are associated with better legal 
systems. 
In order to empirically investigate the effect of a country’s quality of law on bond yields we add to 
specification (10) 	 	 ,  and its interaction with the CAC indicator, and estimate: 
 
, , , , , , ,  (12)
 
where the vector of covariates , ,  includes 	 	 ,  on top of all the variables used in 
specification (10) – week fixed effects, country ratings, and bond-level variables. Regression results are 
reported in rows 2 to 7 in Table 5, separately for each quality of law measure.34 According to specification 
(12), the net effect of CAC provisions is given by 	 	 , , which we report in the table 
for the values of the quality of law indicator(s) that we observe in our sample. Numbers in square brackets 
refer to the percentage of the sample (bond-week observations) that falls into each value. 
According to the DLLS formalism index, these net effects are significantly negative at the 1 percent 
level for more than 85 percent of our sample – with the sole exception of the effect associated to the 
largest value of 5.25 (Spain) which is insignificant – and decrease from left to right. Countries at the 
lowest end of DLLS values (Ireland) on the right witness the largest (log) yield differential between CAC 
and matched no-CAC bonds. Since DLLS sorts countries from good to bad, this evidence is consistent 
with a negative yield differential associated with CAC provisions that widens with the quality of the legal 
system. Different from DLLS, the other five indicators assign larger values to better quality of law 
countries (so that we use a reversed ordering of their values). The net effects of CACs associated to each 
of these indicators are always negative and decrease from left to right. These net effects are all significant 
                                                 
World Bank Rule of Law index shows some (little) variation, at the country level, over time. With the sole exception of DLLS, 
which ranges from good to bad, all indicators assign larger values to countries with better quality of law. DLLS and the LLSV 
indicators are not available for some countries in our sample – see Panel B in Appendix Table A1 for further details. We also 
report all actual index values by country, their correlations and the ratings-related variance inflation factors (to assuage any 
concerns of lack of within-sample variation and multicollinearity) in Appendix Table A2-Panels A to C. 
34  As noted in Subsection IV.A, the coefficient  is informative of the net effect of CACs in a country with 
	 	 , 0, a case we never observe in our sample. For the proxies in rows 3 to 6 a value of 0 would indicate a 
country with extremely low quality of law, which is not observed even in the entire sample of countries for which these 
proxies are available: the lowest value for LLSV(EJ) is 2.5 (Indonesia), for LLSV(RL) is 1.9 (Sri Lanka), for PRS is 0.83 
(Somalia), and for Heritage is 0.5 (North Korea, Turkmenistan and Venezuela). The rule of law index from the World Bank 
in row 7 takes a value very close to zero for Montenegro (0.007), and reaches its lowest value at -2.45 (Somalia). On the 
contrary, since DLLS ranges from good to bad, a value of 0 would indicate a country with extremely high quality of law – 
according to Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2003) the best country is Hong Kong with a formalism index 
of 0.73. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2817041
25 
 
at the 1 percent level, with the exception of countries with relatively worse quality of law that are 
significant at the 5 percent level.35 
Similar to what we have done for country creditworthiness in Subsection IV.A, we also investigate 
the non-linear effects of issuer quality of law in bond valuation. We replace the continuous variable 
	 	 ,  in specification (12) – both its direct effect as well as the interaction with the CAC 
indicator – with the binary variable 	 	 	 	 , , which equals one when a country 
rating is equal or above the (approximately) higher quartile value cut-off, and equal to zero otherwise. 
In columns 2 to 7 of Table 6 both the interactive effect, i.e., the null hypothesis 0, and the net 
effects for weak and strong countries, i.e., the null hypotheses 	= 0 and 0, is then assessed. 
In almost all cases the null hypotheses can be rejected, and estimates indicate economic relevancy 
almost across the board. 
In sum, the evidence on the interplay between CAC provisions and the quality of law is consistent 
with the idea that the incentives to default strategically are weaker in countries with better legal systems. 
V. Further Results: Falsification Exercise  
One potential concern with the evidence cumulated so far is bond-level omitted variables that are 
correlated with both CAC provisions and bond yields. To check for the possibility that the relationship 
between CACs and yields is spurious, we conduct a falsification exercise assuming (wrongly) that the 
Euro CAC initiative took place on January 1, 2011. Making use of the same filtering criteria detailed in 
Section II, we identify a placebo sample consisting of 73 bonds issued between January 1, 2011 and June 
30, 2012 (“pseudo CAC bonds”), which we match with closest-maturity bonds issued prior to January 1, 
2011 (“pseudo no-CAC bonds”).36 Given that the real CAC initiative took place later, the appropriate 
null hypothesis for our falsification test is that the coefficient of the newly estimated (pseudo) CAC 
variable equals zero. 
We then replicate our analyses using this placebo sample. In Table 7 we report random-effects 
estimation results for: 1) our baseline specification (10) replacing  with the pseudo CAC indicator 
                                                 
35 Finland and the Netherlands are those countries that, across all these quality of law measures, rank invariably at the very 
top, together with Luxembourg (for which LLSV values are not available). Italy and Slovakia are at the other end of the 
spectrum for Heritage, PRS and the World Bank proxies; Portugal (resp., Ireland and Spain) ranks worst according to 
LLSV(EJ) (resp., LLSV(RL)). 
36 The matching quality (in terms of residual maturities) is fairly similar to the one of CAC and matched no-CAC bonds: about 
60 percent of bond pairs (42 out of 73) have residual maturities within 6 months, and about 75 percent (56 out of 73) within 
one year. Residual maturities are not statistically different between the two groups of bonds. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2817041
26 
 
(see column 1), and, 2) the saturated model that retains the pseudo CAC indicator as the sole panel 
restriction, while interacting all other variables with country fixed effects (see column 2). Column 1 
corroborates the evidence that bond yields are positively associated with bond-level interest rate risk and 
country credit risk (see Table 3-column 1). Additionally, it suggests that liquidity risk is priced in bond 
yields: larger bonds and those with smaller bid-ask spreads have lower yields, while it is worth recalling 
that these variables were broadly insignificant so far. These findings are contradictory only at a first sight: 
they are indeed consistent with the evidence in Beber, Brandt and Kavajecz (2009) that liquidity matters 
only during times of heightened uncertainty – and there is little doubt that the European sovereign debt 
markets were in turmoil during the years 2011-12. 
Most importantly, neither column in Table 7 certifies significant changes in yields associated with the 
pseudo CAC indicator. We then perform OLS cross-sectional regressions of specification (10) replacing 
 with the pseudo CAC indicator, and dropping the bond-specific random components  and the 
time fixed effects for each week from April 4, 2011 – the first week for which we have 15 bond pairs – 
to December 28, 2012. Figure 6 depicts the point estimates for the coefficient on the pseudo CAC 
indicator (solid blue line) together with their 99 percent confidence intervals (shaded grey area). As the 
figure reveals, the estimates can take either positive or negative values, but crucially we never reject the 
hypothesis that yields are identical between pseudo CAC bonds and their matched counterparts (which, 
recall, is the appropriate null hypothesis for our falsification test). 
Finally, we make use of cross-country variation in creditworthiness and the quality of the legal system 
to estimate specifications (11) and (12) after replacing  with the pseudo CAC indicator. Table 8 
reports the net effects of pseudo CAC provisions, while Table 9 shows the corresponding table for the 
non-linear effects of issuer creditworthiness or quality of law. 
Contrary to our findings based on the sample of CAC and matched no-CAC bonds (see Table 5, and 
its illustrative shading of the estimated coefficients according to their significance levels, as well as Table 
6), we fail, overall, to detect significant differences in yields between the two groups of bonds both across 
the ratings spectrum and the quality of the legal system measures. We conclude that systematic 
differences between recently issued bonds and older bonds are not confounding the reduction in bond 
yields associated with CAC provisions that we documented in Sections III and IV. 
VI. Conclusion 
This paper exploits the Euro Collective Action Clause (CAC) initiative of 2013 to obtain results on a key 
question in law and finance: are the non-financial contract terms of a bond priced? We ask that question 
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in the context of sovereign bonds issued by Euro area countries under domestic law, about one of the 
most debated and important contract clauses, the CAC. The investigation allows us to disentangle the 
effects of contract terms from those of the governing law and examine how the effect of contract terms 
varies depending on the legal framework of the issuer. We find that investors are willing to pay a 
premium for CAC bonds in the Euro area relative to non-CAC bonds, and more so in countries with 
worse ratings and more credible legal systems.  
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Monthly time series of CAC bonds new issuances by aggregate amount (blue bars, left vertical axis)
and by number of issuances (red squares, right vertical axis). CAC bonds are identified as Euro-
denominated zero-coupon or fixed coupon bonds issued under local law by 13 Eurozone countries
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Monthly time series of CAC bonds outstanding by aggregate amount (bars, left vertical axis) and by
fraction of total long-term government debt outstanding (red squares, right vertical axis). Amount
outstanding is split between amount issued (red bars) and amount reopened (blue bars). CAC bonds are
identified as Euro-denominated zero-coupon or fixed coupon bonds issued under local law by 13
Eurozone countries between January 1, 2013 and June 30, 2014 and with maturity (at issuance)
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Histogram of the distance (in absolute value) between CAC and matched no-CAC bonds, expressed in months.
CAC bonds are identified as Euro-denominated zero-coupon or fixed coupon bonds issued under local law by
13 Eurozone countries between January 1, 2013 and June 30, 2014 and with maturity (at issuance) between 1
and 30 years. Matched no-CAC bonds are Euro-denominated zero-coupon or fixed coupon bond issued by the
same national government under local law prior to January 1, 2013 and have maturities as close as possible to
those of CAC bonds.
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Point estimates (solid blue line) together with their 99 percent confidence intervals (shaded grey area) of the
effect of CAC provisions on yields. The sample ranges from February 25, 2013 to December 30, 2014 and
includes 83 bonds issued after January 1, 2013 (CAC bonds) and 83 bonds issued before January 1, 2013
(matched no-CAC bonds). Point estimates are for the CAC indicator from cross-sectional regressions of
weekly log-yields on country rating and a series of bond-level controls (duration, size, bid-ask spread, and
turnover). Definitions of the explanatory variables are provided in Appendix Table A1.
CAC provisions and yield differentials, over time
Figure 5
E
lectronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com
/abstract=
2817041
FIGURE 5. PSEUDO CAC PROVISIONS AND YIELD DIFFERENTIALS, OVER TIME
Point estimates (solid blue line) together with their 99 percent confidence intervals (shaded grey area) of the
effect of Pseudo CAC provisions on yields. The sample ranges from April 4, 2011 to December 28, 2012 and
includes 73 bonds issued after January 1, 2011 (Pseudo CAC bonds) and 73 bonds issued before January 1,
2011 (matched Pseudo no-CAC bonds). Point estimates are for the Pseudo CAC indicator from cross-sectional
regressions of weekly log-yields on country rating and a series of bond-level controls (duration, size, bid-ask
spread, and turnover). Definitions of the explanatory variables are provided in Appendix Table A1.
Pseudo CAC provisions and yield differentials, over time (placebo)
Figure 6
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Issuer Initial CAC provisions Local law
CAC & Matched no-
CAC
Amount (€ bln)
Austria 4 4 4 4 27.35
Belgium 16 13 13 13 47.65
Cyprus 7 7 5 - -
Finland 3 3 3 3 15
France 10 10 10 10 220.57
Germany 5 5 5 5 90
Ireland 2 2 2 2 13.62
Italy 18 18 18 18 297.57
Luxembourg 2 2 2 1 2
Malta 10 9 - - -
the Netherlands 5 5 5 5 76.46
Portugal 6 6 5 5 12.43
Slovakia 4 4 4 4 7.94
Slovenia 4 4 3 3 3.14
Spain 10 10 10 10 179.76
Total 106 102 89 83 993.49
This table describes the country breakdown of bonds at each stage of our data construction process. “Initial” refers to Euro-
denominated zero-coupon or fixed coupon bonds issued by national governments in the Eurozone between January 1, 2013 and
June 30, 2014 and with maturity (at issuance) between 1 and 30 years. The remaining columns describe country
representativeness after each filter: “CAC provisions” requires bonds to be flagged by Bloomberg as including CACs; “Local
law” requires bonds to be local-law bonds; “CAC & Matched no-CAC” requires availability of a comparable no-CAC bond,
which is Euro-denominated zero-coupon or fixed coupon bond issued by the same national government under local law prior to
January 1, 2013 and with maturity as close as possible to that of the CAC bond. Amount outstanding refers to CAC bonds and is
measured at the end of 2014.
Table 1
Data filtering and country representativeness
E






Mean Median 5th Pct. 95th Pct. Mean Median 5th Pct. 95th Pct.
Yield (%) 1.650 1.450 0.207 3.995 1.669 1.419 0.206 4.034 -0.019
Duration 5.852 6.275 0.969 11.184 5.546 5.684 0.99 10.399 0.305***
Log Amount 8.189 9.119 1.740 9.961 8.647 9.518 3.105 10.242 -0.458***
Bid-Ask Spread (%) 0.138 0.045 0.013 0.649 0.160 0.049 0.014 0.837 -0.022***
Turnover (%) 0.663 0.023 0.000 1.703 0.943 0.005 0.000 2.775 -0.280**
Maturity (yrs) 7.644 7.545 1.496 15.789 7.661 7.323 2.003 15.493 -0.017
Table 2
Sample overview CAC and no-CAC bonds (bond-level variables)
CAC bonds (N=5,476) Matched no-CAC bonds (N=5,476)
This table presents means, medians, 5th and 95th percentiles for our samples of CAC and matched no-CAC bonds. Matched no-CAC bonds have maturities as close as possible to those of
CAC bonds. Maturity for CAC bonds is computed at issuance, i.e., the difference between maturity and issue date; for matched no-CAC bonds it is computed as the difference between
maturity date and the issuance date of the CAC bond with which the bond is matched. The time period ranges between January 1, 2013 and December 30, 2014. Descriptive statistics for
maturity are computed in the cross-section (83 bonds in each sample); for other variables these are computed in the panel, i.e., there are 5,476 bond-week observations in each sample. The
last column reports the difference in means between CAC and matched no-CAC bonds together with the t-test statistical significance. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at
the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
E
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dependent variable: weekly log-yields
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CAC -0.084*** -0.050*** -0.069*** -0.053*^ -0.112*** -0.062*** -0.079*** -0.097***
(0.016) (0.019) (0.014) (0.028) (0.024) (0.021) (0.020) (0.027)
Duration 0.261*** 0.473*** 0.177*** × 0.360*** 1.176*** 0.293*** ×
(0.021) (0.088) (0.022) (0.049) (0.154) (0.037)
Log Amount -0.026 -0.055 -0.012 × -0.014 -0.013 -0.023*** ×
(0.016) (0.060) (0.008) (0.010) (0.052) (0.008)
Bid-Ask Spread -0.002 0.813** -0.007 × 0.049 0.014 0.092 ×
(0.110) (0.382) (0.087) (0.079) (0.554) (0.061)
Turnover -0.001 0.980 -0.001 × -0.013 0.592 0.006 ×
(0.035) (0.791) (0.037) (0.035) (0.563) (0.016)
Rating 0.129*** 0.154*** 0.106*** -0.030 -0.022 0.152***
(0.014) (0.012) (0.009) (0.074) (0.040) (0.034)
Bond-level Random Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Matched bond-level Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes - Yes Yes Yes -
Country Fixed Effects x (Bond characteristics) No No No Yes (×) No No No Yes (×)
Country x Week Fixed Effects No No No Yes No No No Yes
Squared and Cross-Products (SCP) or Fitted Log Yields (FLY) No SCP FLY No No SCP FLY No
Observations 10,952 10,952 10,952 10,952 10,952 10,952 10,952 10,952
Bonds 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 166
Adjusted R-squared 0.756 0.790 0.888 0.882 0.884 0.914 0.943 0.924
Table 3
CAC provisions and yield differentials
Random Effects Pooled Ordinary Least Squares
This table presents bond-level random effects (columns 1-4) and pooled ordinary least squares (columns 5-8) regression results to examine the relation between CAC provisions and bond yields. The sample ranges
from January 1, 2013 to December 30, 2014 and includes 83 bonds issued after January 1, 2013 (CAC bonds) and 83 bonds issued before January 1, 2013 with maturities as close as possible to those of CAC
bonds (matched no-CAC bonds). CAC equals one if the bond has CAC provisions, and equals zero otherwise; Duration is the Macaulay Duration-0.5×(Convexity/100); Log Amount is the log-amount outstanding;
Bid-Ask Spread is the percentage bid-ask spread, i.e., (PASK - PBID)/PMID, indicating ask, bid and mid prices, respectively; Turnover is the traded volume across exchanges divided by the amount outstanding;
Rating is the S&P local currency long term debt issuer rating. Further details on the explanatory variables are provided in Appendix Table A1. Squared and Cross-Products (SCP) include the squared and cross-
products of all independent bond-level variables while the Fitted Log Yields (FLY) are the fitted log yields coming from models (1) and (5), respectively, that are included individually raised to the power two,
three, ..., and eight. Bond characteristics interacted with country fixed effects in columns 4 and 8 are indicated with ×. Rating is not included in columns 4 and 8 because it is subsumed by the interactions between
country and week fixed effects. Effects are either included ("Yes"), not included ("No") or subsumed by other sets of effects ("-"). The table reports the estimated coefficients and below in parentheses the standard
errors that are adjusted for clustering at the matched bonds level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level.** Significant at the 5 percent level. *^ Significant at the 6 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent
level. To facilitate the reading of the significance levels for the estimated CAC coefficients we also employ corresponding shades of grey.
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Austria 274               0.185 9.472 8.442            0.099 0.014 -0.506 0.236 9.077 9.265*** 0.09 0.003*** -0.331*** -0.175
Belgium 928               0.014 6.153 4.188            0.082 2.266 -0.049 -0.049* 5.845*** 6.997*** 0.063*** 3.937** 0.038*** -0.087
Finland 206               -0.098 6.891 8.478            0.042 0.394 0.013 0.032 6.86 8.560*** 0.043 0.243*** 0.153*** -0.14
France 562               -0.432 5.737 9.694            0.035 0.148 -0.188 -0.554* 5.109*** 10.113*** 0.037 0.029*** -0.137 -0.051
Germany 334               0.153 8.23 9.673            0.015 0.044 -0.042 -0.066*** 7.221*** 9.810*** 0.021*** 0.012*** 0.007*** -0.048
Ireland 144               0.917 7.617 8.599            0.197 0.002 0.002 0.763*** 6.469*** 9.203*** 0.186 0.001*** 0.163*** -0.161
Italy 1,158            0.385 4.597 9.470            0.038 0.693 0.130 0.428 4.393* 8.813*** 0.127*** 0.410*** 0.210*** -0.08
Luxembourg 77                 0.398 8.061 7.601            0.308 0.001 0.137 0.246** 7.022*** 6.908*** 0.283*** 0.001*** 0.239*** -0.102
the Netherlands 340               -0.644 5.279 9.276            0.032 0.239 -0.251 -0.674 4.818** 9.308 0.031 1.773*** -0.159* -0.092
Portugal 346               0.197 2.453 7.650            0.333 1.099 -0.197 0.447*** 2.463 8.713*** 0.288** 0.754*** 0.077*** -0.274
Slovakia 291               0.716 8.852 7.429            0.92 0.001 -0.507 0.797* 9.026 6.637*** 1.314*** 0.001*** -0.491 -0.016
Slovenia 103               0.594 3.347 6.941            0.743 0.001 0.865 0.974*** 4.223*** 4.043*** 0.084*** 0.546*** 0.946* -0.081
Spain 713               0.554 5.246 9.469            0.074 0.113 0.006 0.531 5.125 9.822*** 0.081 0.063*** 0.024 -0.018
All 5,476            0.178 5.852 8.189            0.138 0.663 -0.063 0.174 5.546*** 8.647*** 0.160*** 0.943** 0.024*** -0.087
This table presents means of bond-level variables for our samples of CAC and matched no-CAC bonds, by country. Matched no-CAC bonds have maturities as close as possible to those of CAC bonds. Maturity for CAC bonds is computed at
issuance, i.e., the difference between maturity and issue date; for matched no-CAC bonds it is computed as the difference between maturity date and the issuance date of the CAC bond with which the bond is matched. The time period ranges
between January 1, 2013 and December 30, 2014. Mean values for maturity are computed in the cross-section (83 bonds in each sample); for other variables these are computed in the panel, i.e., the number of bond-week observations for each
sample/country is reported in the second column. Residuals of Log Yields are computed as the difference between log-yields and log-yields predicted from a bond-level random effects model where log-yields are regressed on duration, log
amount, bid-ask spread, turnover, country rating, and week fixed effects. The t-test statistical significance is indicated next to mean values of the matched no-CAC sample. Differences in mean maturities are not tested due to the small number of
bonds in each country. For Luxembourg the bond amount takes the value of 2,000 (7.601 in log amount) for CAC and the value of 1,000 (7.022 in log amount) for no-CAC bonds and as such we assess it to be different at the 1 percent level. The
last column reports the difference in means of residuals of log-yields between CAC and matched no-CAC bonds. The last row reports mean values for the entire panel. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *
Significant at the 10 percent level.
Sample overview CAC and no-CAC bonds (bond-level variables) by country
CAC bonds Matched no-CAC bonds
Table 4
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CAC provisions and yield differentials: Country creditworthiness and quality of law
Country Rating
Maximum ← Stronger Median Weaker → Minimum
(1) Values (of X) Rating AAA AA+ AA A A- BBB+ BBB BBB- BB
Net effect of CAC -0.052* -0.059** -0.066*** -0.086*** -0.092*** -0.099*** -0.106*** -0.113*** -0.126***
Standard errors (0.031) (0.026) (0.021) (0.017) (0.020) (0.024) (0.029) (0.034) (0.045)
Percent of sample [12.6%] [12.1%] [25.0%] [5.5%] [2.8%] [3.3%] [24.0%] [8.4%] [6.3%]
Country Quality of Law
Minimum ← Weaker Median Stronger → Maximum
(2) Values (of X) DLLS 5.25 4.26 4.04 3.93 3.56 3.52 3.51 3.23 3.14 3.07 2.73 2.63
Net effect of CAC -0.032 -0.075*** -0.084*** -0.089*** -0.105*** -0.107*** -0.107*** -0.119*** -0.123*** -0.126*** -0.141*** -0.145***
Standard errors (0.037) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.030) (0.032)
Percent of sample [13.8%] [2.0%] [22.3%] [6.7%] [1.5%] [5.3%] [6.4%] [10.8%] [4.0%] [6.6%] [17.9%] [2.8%]
(3) Values (of X) LLSV(EJ) 5.5 6.25 6.75 8 8.75 9 9.5 10
Net effect of CAC -0.084** -0.088*** -0.092*** -0.100*** -0.104*** -0.106*** -0.109*** -0.112***
Standard errors (0.041) (0.031) (0.025) (0.018) (0.021) (0.023) (0.029) (0.035)
Percent of sample [6.9%] [14.3%] [23.1%] [11.2%] [2.9%] [6.7%] [24.0%] [11.0%]
(4) Values (of X) LLSV(RL) 7.8 8.33 8.68 8.98 9.23 10
Net effect of CAC -0.057** -0.075*** -0.088*** -0.098*** -0.107*** -0.134***
Standard errors (0.027) (0.020) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.030)
Percent of sample [17.1%] [23.1%] [6.9%] [11.2%] [6.7%] [34.9%]
(5) Values (of X) Heritage 5 6 7 8 9
Net effect of CAC -0.069** -0.075*** -0.081*** -0.087*** -0.093***
Standard errors (0.028) (0.020) (0.016) (0.018) (0.025)
Percent of sample [26.5%] [1.9%] [19.3%] [27.2%] [25.1%]
(6) Values (of X) PRS 6.67 7.5 8.33 10
Net effect of CAC -0.059** -0.072*** -0.085*** -0.111***
Standard errors (0.025) (0.018) (0.016) (0.029)
Percent of sample [26.5%] [1.9%] [52.7%] [19.0%]
(7) Values (of X) World Bank 0.359 0.451 0.975 1.020 1.036 1.399 1.415 1.626 1.725 1.781 1.825 1.835 1.935
Net effect of CAC -0.066** -0.068*** -0.079*** -0.080*** -0.081*** -0.089*** -0.089*** -0.094*** -0.096*** -0.097*** -0.098*** -0.098*** -0.101***
Standard errors (0.027) (0.025) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.028)
Percent of sample [21.2%] [5.3%] [1.9%] [13.0%] [6.3%] [17.0%] [10.3%] [6.1%] [2.6%] [1.4%] [6.2%] [5.0%] [3.8%]
This table presents bond-level random effects regression results to examine the net impact of issuer's creditworthiness and quality of law on the relation between CAC provisions and bond yields. The dependent variable (log(Yieldi,c,t)) is weekly log-yields. The independent control variables
(Z) are: CAC, Duration, Log Amount. Bid-Ask Spread, Turnover. As variables of interest (X) we include: Rating or Quality of Law (X), and CAC * Rating or Quality of Law (CAC * X). When X equals the Quality of Law, control variables Z also include Rating. Week fixed effects are also
included. The estimated equation is therefore:
The sample ranges from January 1, 2013 to December 30, 2014 and includes 83 bonds issued after January 1, 2013 (CAC bonds) and 83 bonds issued before January 1, 2013 (matched no-CAC bonds). CAC equals one if the bond has CAC provisions, and equals zero otherwise; Duration is
the Macaulay Duration-0.5×(Convexity/100); Log Amount is the log-amount outstanding; Bid-Ask Spread is the percentage bid-ask spread, i.e., (PASK - PBID)/PMID, indicating ask, bid and mid prices, respectively; Turnover is the traded volume across exchanges divided by the amount
outstanding; and Rating is the S&P local currency long term debt issuer rating. As Quality of Law variables are: DLLS captures the substantive and procedural statutory intervention in judicial cases at lower-level civil trial courts; LLSV (EJ) is the efficiency and integrity of the legal
environment as it affects business, particularly foreign firms; LLSV (RL) captures the law and order tradition; Heritage is the extent to which a country’s legal framework allows individuals to accumulate private property freely, secured by clear laws that the government enforces effectively;
PRS measures law and order; World Bank captures the rule of law. Further details on the explanatory variables are provided in Appendix Table A1. The table reports the net effect of CAC provisions, i.e., βCACi + ρCACi*Xc,t, for salient Country Ratings, and for values of the Quality of Law
indicators, and below in parentheses the standard errors that are adjusted for clustering at the matched bonds level. The significance levels on the net effects are the outcome of a Wald test of the hypothesis: H: β + ρXc,t = 0, assessed using a Student t distribution. Numbers in square brackets
refer to the percentage of the entire sample (bond-week observations) with a given Rating or with a given value of Quality of Law. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. To facilitate the reading of the significance levels
we also employ corresponding shades of grey.
Variable of Interest 
(X)
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dependent variable: weekly log-yields (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Quality of law proxy = -- DLLS LLSV (EJ) LLSV (RL) Heritage PRS World Bank
CAC -0.080*** -0.047*** -0.082*** -0.084*** -0.076*** -0.074*** -0.077***
(0.017) (0.013) (0.026) (0.027) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Duration 0.260*** 0.272*** 0.282*** 0.283*** 0.262*** 0.262*** 0.263***
(0.027) (0.024) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Log Amount -0.028 -0.039** -0.028 -0.028 -0.020 -0.023 -0.025
(0.022) (0.020) (0.023) (0.022) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024)
Bid-Ask Spread -0.007 0.165 0.103 0.104 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003
(0.117) (0.214) (0.249) (0.251) (0.121) (0.121) (0.121)
Turnover -0.001 -0.004 0.011 0.011 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.050) (0.057) (0.047) (0.047) (0.050) (0.050) (0.049)
Rating 0.135*** 0.085*** 0.117*** 0.108*** 0.119*** 0.122*** 0.126***
(0.016) (0.031) (0.024) (0.035) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016)
Weak (Rating ) -0.034
(0.141)
Weak (Rating ) x CAC -0.035***
(0.012)
Strong (Quality of Law ) -0.501** -0.192 -0.251 -0.151 -0.148 -0.125
(0.232) (0.157) (0.252) (0.130) (0.117) (0.142)
Strong (Quality of Law ) x CAC -0.083*** -0.039 -0.027 -0.027 -0.048** -0.081***
(0.023) (0.043) (0.041) (0.028) (0.027) (0.022)
Week Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
CAC + Weak (Rating ) x CAC -0.115***
(0.027)
CAC + Strong (Quality of Law ) x CAC -0.130*** -0.120*** -0.111*** -0.103*** -0.123*** -0.158***
(0.022) (0.031) (0.031) (0.025) (0.019) (0.016)
Observations 10,952 10,370 10,010 10,010 10,952 10,952 10,952
Bonds 166 158 150 150 166 166 166
Adjusted R-squared 0.759 0.775 0.777 0.775 0.753 0.755 0.756
Table 6
CAC provisions and yield differentials: Country creditworthiness and quality of law (nonlinearities)
This table presents bond-level random effects regression results to examine the net impact of issuer's creditworthiness and quality of law on the relation between
CAC provisions and bond yields. The sample ranges from January 1, 2013 to December 30, 2014 and includes 83 bonds issued after January 1, 2013 (CAC
bonds) and 83 bonds issued before January 1, 2013 (matched no-CAC bonds). CAC equals one if the bond has CAC provisions, and equals zero otherwise;
Duration is the Macaulay Duration-0.5×(Convexity/100); Log Amount is the log-amount outstanding; Bid-Ask Spread is the percentage bid-ask spread, i.e.,
(PASK - PBID)/PMID, indicating ask, bid and mid prices, respectively; Turnover is the traded volume across exchanges divided by the amount outstanding;
Rating is the S&P local currency long term debt issuer rating; DLLS captures the substantive and procedural statutory intervention in judicial cases at lower-level
civil trial courts; LLSV (EJ) is the efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects business, particularly foreign firms; LLSV (RL) captures the law
and order tradition; Heritage is the extent to which a country’s legal framework allows individuals to accumulate private property freely, secured by clear laws
that the government enforces effectively; PRS measures law and order; World Bank captures the rule of law. Weak (Rating) equals one if the Rating equals BBB-
or is below, and equals zero otherwise. Strong (Quality of Law) equals one if the value of DLLS <= 4.04, LLSV (EJ) >= 9.5, LLSV (RL) >= 9.23, Heritage = 9,
PRS = 10, or WB >= 1.84, and equals zero otherwise. Further details on the explanatory variables are provided in Appendix Table A1. The table reports the
estimated coefficients, and below in parentheses the standard errors that are adjusted for clustering at the country level. For the interaction terms Weak (Rating) x
CAC and Strong (Quality of Law) x CAC significance is based on the one sided test for the null that the interaction term is >= 0. *** Significant at the 1 percent
level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. To facilitate the reading of the significance levels for the estimated CAC
coefficients and their interactions we also employ corresponding shades of grey. 
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dependent variable: weekly log-yields (1) (2)




Log Amount -0.044** ×
(0.021)






Bond-level Random Effects Yes Yes
Week Fixed Effects Yes -
Country Fixed Effects x (Bond characteristics) No Yes (×)
Country x Week Fixed Effects No Yes
Observations 9,440 9,440
Bonds 146 146
Adjusted R-squared 0.723 0.836
This table presents bond-level random effects regression results to examine the relation between pseudo
CAC provisions and bond yields. The sample ranges from January 1, 2011 to December 30, 2012 and
includes 73 bonds issued after January 1, 2011 (pseudo CAC bonds) and 73 bonds issued before January 1,
2011 (matched pseudo no-CAC bonds). Pseudo CAC equals one if the bond was issued between Jan 2011
and June 2012, and equals zero otherwise; Duration is the Macaulay Duration-0.5×(Convexity/100); Log
Amount is the log-amount outstanding; Bid-Ask Spread is the percentage bid-ask spread, i.e., (PASK - 
PBID)/PMID, indicating ask, bid and mid prices, respectively; Turnover is the traded volume across
exchanges divided by the amount outstanding; and Rating is the S&P local currency long term debt issuer
rating. Further details on the explanatory variables are provided in Appendix Table A1. Bond
characteristics interacted with country fixed effects in column 2 are indicated with ×. Rating is not included
in column 2 because it is subsumed by the interactions between country and week fixed effects. Effects are
either included ("Yes"), not included ("No") or subsumed by other sets of effects ("-"). The table reports
the estimated coefficients and below in parentheses the standard errors that are adjusted for clustering at the
matched bonds level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *
Significant at the 10 percent level. To facilitate the reading of the significance levels for the estimated CAC
coefficients we also employ corresponding shades of grey.
Table 7
Pseudo CAC provisions and yield differentials (placebo)
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Table 8
CAC provisions and yield differentials: Country creditworthiness and quality of law (placebo)
Country Rating
Maximum ← Stronger Median Weaker → Minimum
(1) Values (of X) Rating AAA AA+ AA AA- A A- BBB+ BBB BBB- BB
Net effect of pseudo CAC -0.084* -0.072* -0.060* -0.048 -0.036 -0.023 0.001 0.013 0.026 0.050
Standard errors (0.046) (0.041) (0.036) (0.033) (0.030) (0.028) (0.029) (0.032) (0.035) (0.045)
Percent of sample [23.7%] [12.2%] [17.8%] [2.5%] [3.6%] [9.4%] [24.9%] [0.1%] [4.0%] [1.9%]
Country Quality of Law
Minimum ← Weaker Median Stronger → Maximum
(2) Values (of X) DLLS 5.25 4.04 3.93 3.56 3.52 3.51 3.23 3.14 3.07 2.73 2.63
Net effect of pseudo CAC -0.056* -0.059** -0.059* -0.060 -0.060 -0.060 -0.061 -0.061 -0.061 -0.062 -0.062
Standard errors (0.029) (0.028) (0.030) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.046) (0.049) (0.050) (0.059) (0.062)
Percent of sample [20.9%] [23.9%] [3.0%] [0.9%] [3.3%] [5.5%] [10.3%] [4.6%] [9.0%] [17.6%] [1.0%]
(3) Values (of X) LLSV(EJ) 5.5 6.25 6.75 8 8.75 9 9.5 10
Net effect of pseudo CAC -0.037 -0.045* -0.050** -0.062* -0.070 -0.072 -0.077 -0.082
Standard errors (0.033) (0.026) (0.025) (0.033) (0.043) (0.047) (0.054) (0.062)
Percent of sample [3.0%] [21.0%] [24.2%] [10.4%] [1.1%] [5.6%] [21.0%] [13.8%]
(4) Values (of X) LLSV(RL) 7.8 8.33 8.68 8.98 9.23 10
Net effect of pseudo CAC -0.049* -0.057** -0.062** -0.067* -0.071* -0.082
Standard errors (0.027) (0.025) (0.029) (0.036) (0.042) (0.063)
Percent of sample [22.1%] [24.2%] [3.0%] [10.4%] [5.6%] [34.8%]
(5) Values (of X) Heritage 5 7 8 9
Net effect of pseudo CAC 0.009 -0.034 -0.055 -0.076
Standard errors (0.019) (0.028) (0.037) (0.047)
Percent of sample [25.9%] [23.2%] [27.1%] [23.8%]
(6) Values (of X) PRS 6.67 8.33 10
Net effect of pseudo CAC 0.019 -0.043 -0.104**
Standard errors (0.024) (0.030) (0.048)
Percent of sample [25.9%] [55.7%] [18.4%]
(7) Values (of X) World Bank 0.399 0.549 1.035 1.167 1.387 1.476 1.612 1.765 1.802 1.808 1.812 1.966
Net effect of pseudo CAC 0.015 0.005 -0.028 -0.037 -0.052 -0.058 -0.067* -0.077* -0.079* -0.080* -0.080* -0.091*
Standard errors (0.020) (0.020) (0.026) (0.029) (0.034) (0.037) (0.040) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.050)
Percent of sample [22.3%] [2.6%] [2.9%] [20.3%] [17.1%] [10.0%] [5.4%] [1.0%] [0.9%] [3.2%] [8.8%] [4.5%]
Variable of Interest 
(X)
This table presents bond-level random effects regression results to examine the net impact of issuer's creditworthiness and quality of law on the relation between pseudo CAC provisions and bond yields. The dependent variable (log(Yieldi,c,t) is weekly log-yields. The independent control variables
(Z) are: pseudo CAC, Duration, Log Amount. Bid-Ask Spread, Turnover. As variables of interest (X) we include: Rating or Quality of Law (X), and pseudo CAC * Rating or Quality of Law (pseudo CAC * X). When X equals the Quality of Law, control variables Z also include Rating. Week fixed
effects are also included. The estimated equation is therefore:
The sample ranges from January 1, 2011 to December 30, 2012 and includes 73 bonds issued after January 1, 2011 (pseudo CAC bonds) and 73 bonds issued before January 1, 2011 (matched pseudo no-CAC bonds). Pseudo CAC equals one if the bond was issued between January 2011 and June
2012, and equals zero otherwise; Duration is the Macaulay Duration-0.5×(Convexity/100); Log Amount is the log-amount outstanding; Bid-Ask Spread is the percentage bid-ask spread, i.e., (PASK - PBID)/PMID, indicating ask, bid and mid prices, respectively; Turnover is the traded volume across
exchanges divided by the amount outstanding; and Rating is the S&P local currency long term debt issuer rating. As Quality of Law variables are: DLLS captures the substantive and procedural statutory intervention in judicial cases at lower-level civil trial courts; LLSV (EJ) is the efficiency and
integrity of the legal environment as it affects business, particularly foreign firms; LLSV (RL) captures the law and order tradition; Heritage is the extent to which a country’s legal framework allows individuals to accumulate private property freely, secured by clear laws that the government enforces
effectively; PRS measures law and order; World Bank captures the rule of law. Further details on the explanatory variables are provided in Appendix Table A1. The table reports the net effect of pseudo CAC provisions, i.e., βpseudo CACi + ρpseudo CACi * Xc,t, for salient Country Ratings, and for
values of the Quality of Law indicators, and below in parentheses the standard errors that are adjusted for clustering at the matched bonds level. The significance levels on the net effects are the outcome of a Wald test of the hypothesis: H: β + ρXc,t = 0, assessed using a Student t distribution.
Numbers in square brackets refer to the percentage of the entire sample (bond-week observations) with a given Rating or with a given value of Quality of Law. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. For Chi-squared test: ⁺⁺⁺
Significant at the 1 percent level. To facilitate the reading of the significance levels we also employ corresponding shades of grey.
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dependent variable: weekly log-yields (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Quality of law proxy = -- DLLS LLSV (EJ) LLSV (RL) Heritage PRS World Bank
Pseudo CAC -0.040 -0.053 -0.047 -0.048 -0.015 -0.021 -0.026
(0.038) (0.038) (0.040) (0.042) (0.043) (0.040) (0.040)
Duration 0.169*** 0.164*** 0.168*** 0.175*** 0.172*** 0.168*** 0.168***
(0.033) (0.035) (0.033) (0.028) (0.033) (0.034) (0.035)
Log Amount -0.042** -0.061** -0.065** -0.065** -0.038* -0.042** -0.040**
(0.019) (0.029) (0.031) (0.027) (0.022) (0.021) (0.020)
Bid-Ask Spread 0.198** 0.206* 0.202* 0.198* 0.197* 0.198* 0.193*
(0.093) (0.115) (0.112) (0.107) (0.101) (0.104) (0.100)
Turnover -0.079 -0.083 -0.082 -0.081 -0.095 -0.092 -0.091
(0.075) (0.076) (0.078) (0.077) (0.083) (0.080) (0.079)
Rating 0.224*** 0.196*** 0.193*** 0.188*** 0.192*** 0.195*** 0.194***
(0.036) (0.038) (0.041) (0.045) (0.039) (0.037) (0.036)
Weak (Rating ) -0.320***
(0.111)
Weak (Rating ) x Pseudo CAC 0.037
(0.034)
Strong (Quality of Law ) -0.147 -0.165 -0.240 -0.206 -0.164 -0.289**
(0.143) (0.170) (0.216) (0.152) (0.154) (0.137)
Strong (Quality of Law ) x Pseudo CAC -0.009 -0.033 -0.032 -0.077** -0.087** -0.065*
(0.058) (0.053) (0.043) (0.038) (0.042) (0.049)
Week Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo CAC + Weak (Rating ) x Pseudo CAC -0.003
(0.045)
Pseudo CAC + Strong (Quality of Law ) x Pseudo CAC -0.062 -0.080 -0.079 -0.093*** -0.109*** -0.092**
(0.081) (0.075) (0.061) (0.031) (0.031) (0.036)
Observations 9,440 9,198 9,116 9,116 9,440 9,440 9,440
Bonds 146 142 140 140 146 146 146
Adjusted R-squared 0.734 0.723 0.721 0.721 0.725 0.724 0.728
Table 9
CAC provisions and yield differentials: Country creditworthiness and quality of law (nonlinearities, placebo)
This table presents bond-level random effects regression results to examine the net impact of issuer's creditworthiness and quality of law on the relation between pseudo CAC provisions
and bond yields. The sample ranges from January 1, 2011 to December 30, 2012 and includes 73 bonds issued after January 1, 2011 (pseudo CAC bonds) and 73 bonds issued before
January 1, 2011 (matched pseudo no-CAC bonds). Pseudo CAC equals one if the bond was issued between January 2011 and June 2012, and equals zero otherwise; Duration is the
Macaulay Duration-0.5×(Convexity/100); Log Amount is the log-amount outstanding; Bid-Ask Spread is the percentage bid-ask spread, i.e., (PASK - PBID)/PMID, indicating ask, bid
and mid prices, respectively; Turnover is the traded volume across exchanges divided by the amount outstanding; Rating is the S&P local currency long term debt issuer rating; DLLS
captures the substantive and procedural statutory intervention in judicial cases at lower-level civil trial courts; LLSV (EJ) is the efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it
affects business, particularly foreign firms; LLSV (RL) captures the law and order tradition; Heritage is the extent to which a country’s legal framework allows individuals to accumulate
private property freely, secured by clear laws that the government enforces effectively; PRS measures law and order; World Bank captures the rule of law. Weak (Rating) equals one if
the Rating equals BBB or is below, and equals zero otherwise. Strong (Quality of Law) equals one if the value of DLLS <= 4.04, LLSV (EJ) >= 9.5, LLSV (RL) >= 9.23, Heritage = 9,
PRS = 10, or WB >= 1.81, and equals zero otherwise. Further details on the explanatory variables are provided in Appendix Table A1. The table reports the estimated coefficients, and
below in parentheses the standard errors that are adjusted for clustering at the country level. For the interaction terms Weak (Rating) x Pseudo CAC and Strong (Quality of Law) x
Pseudo CAC significance is based on the one sided test for the null that the interaction term is >=0. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *
Significant at the 10 percent level. To facilitate the reading of the significance levels for the estimated Pseudo CAC coefficients and their interactions we also employ corresponding
shades of grey.
E






Proof of Proposition 1: The proposition follows easily from equating (2) and (7). Given  , after 
rearranging the terms, we obtain: 
           γy 		 	 γy 	.

 
Thus, 0 if (8) holds, as in the proposition. ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: Part i) of the proposition follows directly from inspection of (8). An increase in 
the mass of f(y) in the region ∈ , ] relative to the region ∈ [ , ] would simply increase the 
LHS relative to the RHS of (8), thus enlarging the difference .  
For part (ii) of the proposition, we first need to derive how  and 	vary with . From (2) and (7) 
we derive the following implicit functions FN and FC: 
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A.2 
 
It follows that the difference 	increases with  if the expression in (P.4) is larger in absolute 
value than the expression in (P.3). Considering that an increase in the expected repayment	  benefits 
no-CAC bondholders more than CAC bondholders given  and  (i.e., 
	⁄ > 	 ⁄ ), a sufficient condition for  to be increasing in  is that ⁄
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Panel A: Main variables
Variable Description Unit/Scale
CAC =1 if bond has CAC provisions, =0 otherwise 0/1
Pseudo CAC =1 if bond issued between Jan 2011 and June 2012, =0 otherwise 0/1
Duration Macaulay Duration-0.5×(Convexity/100) -
Log Amount Log-amount outstanding Mln € (log)
Bid-Ask Spread Percentage bid-ask spread (PASK-PBID)/PMID %
Turnover Traded volume across exchanges /Amount outstanding Decimals
Rating S&P local currency LT debt issuer rating 1(AAA) to 12(BB)
Panel B. Quality of law proxies
Variable name Acronym Description Source
Min-max sample values
[country code]
Formalism Index DLLS Substantive and procedural statutory intervention in judicial cases at lower-level civil trial courts.» (7 point scale,
good to bad). Not available for Slovakia.
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, Courts, 2003,
Quarterly Journal of Economics  118, 2(1), 453-517
2.63 [IE]
5.25 [ES]
Judicial Efficiency Index LLSV (EJ) Efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects business, particularly foreign firms.» (10 point scale,
bad to good). Not available for Luxembourg, Slovakia and Slovenia.
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, Vishny, Law and Finance,
Journal of Political Economy , 1998, 106(6), 1113-1155
5.5 [PT] 
10 [FI, NL]
Rule of Law Index LLSV (RL) Law and order tradition.» (10 point scale, bad to good). Not available for Luxembourg, Slovakia and Slovenia. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, Vishny, Law and Finance,
Journal of Political Economy , 1998, 106(6), 1113-1155
7.8 [ES, IE] 
10 [AT, BE, FI, NL]
Property Rights Index Heritage The extent to which a country’s legal framework allows individuals to accumulate private property freely, secured
by clear laws that the government enforces effectively.» (100 point original scale; rescaled on a 10 point scale, bad
to good). Contemporaneous values.
Heritage Foundation, Index of Economic Freedom 
https://www.heritage.org/index/
5 [IT] 
9 [AT, DE, FI, IE, LU, NL]
Law and Order Index PRS “Law and Order” form a single component, but its two elements are assessed separately, with each element being
scored from zero to three points. To assess the “Law” element, the strength and impartiality of the legal system are
considered, while the “Order” element is an assessment of popular observance of the law.» (6 point original scale;
rescaled on a 10 point scale, bad to good). Lagged values.
PRS Group/ICRG Political Risk Rating 
https://www.prsgroup.com/ 
6.67 [IT, SK] 
10 [AT, FI, IE, LU, NL]
Rule of Law Index World Bank Rule of law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society,
and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the
likelihood of crime and violence.». (5 point scale from -2.5 to 2.5, bad to good). Two-year average lagged values.
World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators 
http://databank.worldbank.org/  (2014 update)
0.359 [IT] 
1.966 [FI]
This table provides a detailed description of our variables. Panel A: ratings are measured every Friday; all other variables are weekly averages of daily values. Data source is Bloomberg. Panel B: data source as indicated. December values for PRS sourced from










Appendix Table A2 Panel A. Variables, country breakdown
DLLS LLSV(EJ) LLSV(RL) Heritage PRS 
2013-14 2011-12 2013-14 2011-12
Austria AA+ AAA,AA+ 3.52 9.5 10 9 10 1.835 1.808
Belgium AA AA+,AA 2.73 9.5 10 8 8.33 1.399 1.387
Finland AAA,AA+ AAA 3.14 10 10 9 10 1.935 1.966
France AA+,AA AAA,AA+ 3.23 8 8.98 8 8.33 1.415 1.476
Germany AAA AAA 3.51 9 9.23 9 8.33 1.626 1.612
Ireland A,A-,BBB+ BBB+ 2.63 8.75 7.8 9 10 1.725 1.765
Italy BBB+,BBB,BBB- A+,A,BBB+ 4.04 6.75 8.33 5 6.67 0.359 0.399
Luxembourg AAA AAA 3.56 - - 9 10 1.781 1.802
the Netherlands AAA,AA+ AAA 3.07 10 10 9 10 1.825 1.812
Portugal BB BBB,BBB-,BB 3.93 5.5 8.68 7 8.33 1.036 1.035
Slovakia A A+,A - - - 5 6.67 0.451 0.549
Slovenia A- - 4.26 - - 6 7.5 0.975 -
Spain BBB,BBB- AA,AA-,A,BBB+,BBB- 5.25 6.25 7.8 7 8.33 1.020 1.167
Rating World Bank
E
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Appendix Table A2 Panel B. Correlation matrix
Rating DLLS LLSV(EJ) LLSV(RL) Heritage PRS Rating DLLS LLSV(EJ) LLSV(RL) Heritage PRS 
DLLS 0.713 0.598
LLSV(EJ) -0.926 -0.804 -0.805 -0.849
LLSV(RL) -0.823 -0.804 0.875 -0.719 -0.887 0.943
Heritage -0.728 -0.527 0.746 0.641 -0.744 -0.488 0.759 0.672
PRS -0.551 -0.360 0.620 0.518 0.919 -0.606 -0.310 0.643 0.553 0.919
World Bank -0.750 -0.541 0.770 0.674 0.992 0.938 -0.735 -0.429 0.726 0.631 0.990 0.950
Appendix Table A2 Panel C. VIF between Rating and quality of law indicator
Rating  with DLLS LLSV(EJ) LLSV(RL) Heritage PRS World Bank DLLS LLSV(EJ) LLSV(RL) Heritage PRS World Bank
VIF 2.03 7.02 3.11 2.13 1.44 2.28 1.56 2.84 2.07 2.24 1.58 2.17
Tolerance 0.492 0.142 0.322 0.470 0.696 0.438 0.642 0.352 0.483 0.447 0.633 0.460
2011-12
This table presents values for the country-level variables (Panel A), their correlation matrix (Panel B) and the Variance Inflation Factor between country ratings and the quality of law proxies (Panel C).
In Panel A, values for the World Bank Rule of Law indicator are not reported during 2011-12 for country-years that are not included in the placebo sample. Rating is the S&P local currency long term
debt issuer rating; DLLS captures the substantive and procedural statutory intervention in judicial cases at lower-level civil trial courts; LLSV (EJ) is the efficiency and integrity of the legal environment
as it affects business, particularly foreign firms; LLSV (RL) captures the law and order tradition; Heritage is the extent to which a country’s legal framework allows individuals to accumulate private
property freely, secured by clear laws that the government enforces effectively; PRS measures law and order; World Bank captures the rule of law. "-" indicates missing observations. Further details on
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